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SOCIOLOGY BEFORE COMTE:
A SUMMARY OF DOCTRINES AND AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
LITERATURE¹

HARRY E. BARNES
Columbia University

I. INTRODUCTION

The social philosophy of ancient, mediaeval, and early modern writers must be gleaned from the larger mass of philosophical, theological, economic, political, and legal doctrines, for, as might be expected, in no period or writer is there to be found any strict differentiation between the social philosophy, on the one hand, and the religious, moral, economic, or political theories, on the other hand. Nor is there found in many cases a serious attempt to build up a definite or well-balanced system of social philosophy.

At the same time, the recognition of these facts furnishes no adequate justification for refusing to go back of Comte for the sources of sociological thought. It is hoped that even this brief survey of the pre-Comtian period will substantiate the truth of the statement that, from the time of Plato onward, thinkers were approaching, and to a certain extent successfully formulating, the chief problems of sociology. Indeed, as Professor Small has pointed out, only the most mediocre writer can be adequately described simply by classifying him as a sociologist, historian, economist, or political scientist. The aim and purpose of the writer constitute the most valid basis for organizing his contributions to social science.² One is therefore justified in seeking the origins of sociology as far in the past as there can be discovered a conscious attempt on the part of any writer to record or to explain the fundamental problems of social organization and development.

¹ This article has profited by the critical comments of Professors William A. Dunning and Alvan A. Tenney, who kindly consented to read it in manuscript and proof.

² Small, *The Cameralists*, chap. i; *The Meaning of Social Science*, *passim*.

In any attempt, however cursory, to trace the development of sociological thought, it is necessary to keep in mind the fundamental truth so well expressed by Professor Giddings¹ and Professor Small,² that the doctrines of any writer lose most of their significance unless their relation to the prevailing social environment is pointed out and the purposes of his work are clearly indicated. While in the present article the treatment of these important phases of the general topic must, like the summary of doctrines, be extremely condensed, the attempt will be made to indicate the general conditions out of which the sociological thought of each period developed.

Anything like a systematic discussion of social phenomena began with the Greeks. The writers of oriental antiquity were prevented by the general conditions of their social environment from advancing any strikingly original generalizations concerning the origin and nature of social institutions. A rural economy, caste, superstition, an inflexible religious system, and sumptuary legislation, begotten of the passion of the antique mind for homogeneity, tended to give social conditions a fixity and sanctity which discouraged any extensive speculation as to their origin, nature, or possible means of improvement. When social institutions were fixed by a tyrannical customary code and confirmed by an inscrutable Providence, there could be no "science" of society. Consequently, in oriental antiquity most of the thinking upon social problems consisted in formulating elaborate schemes of justification for the existence of the given régime, these mainly centering about the sanctions of a unique revealed religion or the superior wisdom of ancestors.³

To be sure, there are to be found moral and social precepts in the works of the Egyptian scribes;⁴ valuable bits of applied and descriptive sociology may be gleaned from the Babylonian records,

¹ *American Journal of Sociology*, September, 1904, pp. 169-70.

² *The Cameralists*, chap. 1.

³ Cf. Marvin, *The Living Past*, chap. iii; Giddings, *Elements of Sociology*, pp. 283 ff.; Taylor, *Ancient Ideals*, I, chaps. ii-iv.

⁴ Cf. Breasted, *Ancient Records of Egypt; Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt*, particularly pp. 199 ff.

particularly from the Code of Hammurapi;¹ much of sociological interest may be found in the ancient books of the Aryans of India;² the Hebrew legal codes and prophetic teachings are replete with sociological and anthropological interest;³ and most of the Chinese religious and moral doctrines come from a more remote antiquity than those of the great philosophers of Greece;⁴ but the definite and coherent analysis of social phenomena and processes, as far as extant records may furnish the basis for a judgment, originated with the Greek philosophers of the post-Socratic period.⁵

II. SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY AMONG THE GREEKS

While it is impossible to account for Greek originality and freedom of thought entirely upon the basis of the surrounding conditions,⁶ it is nevertheless true that the characteristic trends in the sociological thinking of the Greeks can be traced back to the social environment.

In the first place, the lack of an extensive or highly centralized political organization, bringing together in one unified state many different peoples, allowed the tribal spirit of localism and provincialism to have free play, and it pervaded most of Greek thinking upon social phenomena. With the exception of the Stoics, the contrast of Greek and barbarian stands out clearly in all of the great Greek studies of social institutions. But if the Greek city-state fostered a rather narrow local conceit, it also rendered possible a high degree of like-mindedness on the part of the citizens. This led to that group self-consciousness which lies at the basis of those

¹ C. H. W. Johns, *Babylonian and Assyrian Laws, Contracts, and Letters*, 1904; see Professor Vincent's article in *American Journal of Sociology*, IX, 737-54.

² Cf. Frazer, *Indian Thought, Past and Present*.

³ Cf. Kent, *Israel's Laws and Legal Precedents; The Social Teachings of the Prophets and Jesus*; Wallis, *A Sociological Study of the Bible*; Day, *Social Life of the Hebrews*.

⁴ Cf. Giles, *Confucianism and Its Rivals and Ancient Religions of China*; DeGroot, *The Religious Systems of China*; and Suzuki, *A Brief History of Ancient Chinese Philosophy*.

⁵ For the period of antiquity in general, see Willoughby, *Political Theories of the Ancient World*, pp. 3-30; Janet, *Histoire de la science politique*, I, 1-51.

⁶ Cf. Bury, *The History of the Freedom of Thought*, pp. 22 ff.

utopian or idealistic theories of society which appear in the *Republic* of Plato and the *Politics* of Aristotle. Again, the freedom and liberty of the democratic city-state and the absence of a coercive state religion made for that critical philosophy which first appeared on any considerable scale among the Attic Greeks. In spite of the pretensions of Athens as a commercial empire, Greek civilization was primarily based upon an agricultural economy, which, through its routine and repetition, invariably begets a static outlook upon the social process. Consequently, one is not surprised to find Aristotle setting up stability as the most perfect test of the excellence of a state. In spite of their intellectual activity, there was little inductive study of social phenomena among the Greeks. Aristotle furnishes the only notable exception to this statement. While the dependence of Greek civilization upon slavery has doubtless been exaggerated,¹ the Greeks despised the humble and commonplace methods of natural science and preferred the freer ranges of a priori generalization. The possibilities of deductive thinking about the social process were accordingly exhausted by the Greeks. It was not until natural science had established the inductive methods in social science that the *Politics* of Aristotle and the *Republic* and *Laws* of Plato were surpassed as analyses of social phenomena by the works of Comte, Quételet, Spencer, and Ward.²

The period of Greek thought before Plato has left no voluminous remains, but from the sources available several interesting suggestions and developments may be discovered. Hesiod (eighth century B.C.) had outlined the culture ages from the conventional viewpoint of a descent from a "golden age," and had voiced his protest against existing social and economic conditions.³ Anaximander (610-546 B.C.) had antedated John Fiske by twenty-four centuries in his discussion of the prolongation of human infancy

¹ Cf. Zimmern, *Sociological Review*, 1909, pp. 1 ff., 159 ff.

² This scanty survey of the social environment of Greek social philosophy may be supplemented by Zimmern, *The Greek Commonwealth*; Botsford and Sihler, *Hellenic Civilization*, pp. 210-54, 303-48, 423-526, 657-708; and Marvin, *op. cit.*, chap. iv.

³ Hesiod, *Works and Days*, trans. by A. W. Main (Oxford, 1908), pp. 4 ff.

in its relation to human society.¹ Theognis (ca. 550 B.C.) had clearly perceived the principles of eugenics as applied to the human race.² Aeschylus (525-456 B.C.) had anticipated Lucretius by more than four centuries in his highly interesting account of the general evolution of civilization.³ Herodotus (d. after 430 B.C.), by his acute observations and striking descriptions of the manners, customs, and physical characteristics of foreign peoples, had earned the title of the first great "descriptive sociologist."⁴ The Sophists had apparently advanced the conception of a primordial state of nature and a subsequent social, or at least a governmental, compact.⁵ Hippocrates (ca. 460-370 B.C.), in his work on *Airs, Waters, and Places*, presented the first serious analysis of the influence of physical environment upon human society. He described the effect of climate and topography upon the peoples of Asia in regard to political institutions and physical characteristics with an accuracy and detail not equaled before Ibn Khaldun, Aquinas, and Bodin. His work constituted the point of departure for all treatments of the influence of physical environment till the time of Ritter.⁶ Finally, Socrates (471-399 B.C.) had presented the doctrine of a law of nature, as contrasted with human law, and had attempted to reduce ethics to something like a science.⁷

Plato (427-347 B.C.), in his search after an adequate definition of justice, was led into making an analysis of society and of the state.

¹ Nicholas Murray Butler, "Anaximander on the Prolongation of Infancy in Man," in *Classical Studies in Honor of Henry Drisler*, pp. 8-10.

² *The Works of Hesiod, Callimachus, and Theognis*, trans. by Banks in Bohn's Classical Library, 1856, pp. 227-28.

³ Botsford and Sihler, *op. cit.*, pp. 64-65.

⁴ *History of Herodotus*, trans. by George Rawlinson, 4 vols., 1859-60; see Myres, in *Anthropology and the Classics*, edited by Marett, chap. v, "Herodotus and Anthropology."

⁵ Willoughby, *op. cit.*, pp. 78-79; Barker, *The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle*, pp. 28-46.

⁶ *The Genuine Works of Hippocrates*, translated by Adams, London, 1849, Vol. I, pp. 190-222.

⁷ Janet, *Histoire de la science politique*, I, 84-94; Dunning, *A History of Political Theories, Ancient and Medieval*, pp. 21-23; Barker, *op. cit.*, pp. 46-60. For the pre-Socratic period in general, see Willoughby, *op. cit.*, pp. 30 ff.; Barker, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-46; Janet, *op. cit.*, I, 51-103; Zeller, *Greek Philosophy to the Time of Socrates*, 2 vols.

He outlined the organic theory of society and found not only the economic but also the ethical basis of society to be embodied in the functional division of labor.¹ In this respect he contributed what is probably the most satisfactory analysis of the economic foundations of society which is to be found in the works of any writer of antiquity.

He recognized the existence and importance of the organization of the social mind, though he wrongly considered it as merely the sum of the individual minds in the social group.² Adopting the premises that man can control his own social relations and that concerted volition would be the necessary result of similar external surroundings and stimuli, he constructed one of the most complete of the utopian plans for an ideal society of which history bears any record.³ It is interesting to note that, aside from its communistic aspects, this utopia of Plato provided for the first comprehensive scheme of eugenics in the history of social or biological philosophy.⁴

Especially interesting is Plato's contribution to historical sociology. With almost the perspective of a nineteenth century evolutionist, he discerned something of the true nature of social evolution and the time requisite for its consummation, and presented his own theories on the subject, which were exceedingly accurate for one possessed of his scanty data.⁵ Finally, in decided contrast to his predecessors and to many of his successors, Plato tried to comprehend and analyze society as a unity and in its entirety.⁶

Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), the most influential of all writers on social philosophy, both on account of the profundity of his insight

¹ *Republic*, in Jowett's *Dialogues of Plato*, II, 369; IV, 433; Barker, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

² *Republic*, v, 462, and Introduction by Jowett, pp. cxcviii-cxcix.

³ *Republic*, iii, 412-17; v, 458-62.

⁴ *Ibid.*, v, 458-62.

⁵ *Laws* (Jowett), iii, 676-84.

⁶ For one of the best discussions of Plato's social and political philosophy to be found in any language, see Barker, *op. cit.*, pp. 60-207; for a history of the later influence of the *Republic*, *ibid.*, pp. 525-30; cf. also Nettleship, *Lectures on the Republic of Plato*; and Loos, *Studies in the Politics of Aristotle and the Republic of Plato*, pp. 182-291.

into social processes, and because of his peculiar relation to mediæval thought,¹ made many advances over Plato in his investigation of the basis and justification of political and social relationships. In the first place, Aristotle introduced the inductive method of studying social phenomena, while Plato had relied almost entirely upon the far less scientific deductive line of approach.² But probably more important than this was his direct and clean-cut assertion that man is by nature a social being.³ This dictum, had it been heeded by later writers, would have precluded any possibility of the erroneous interpretations of society, such as that of an original social contract, which were based upon the doctrine of conscious self-interest. As a deduction from this dogma of man's inherent sociability, he pointed out the necessity of social relations for the complete development of the human personality, and made plain the abnormality of the non-social being.⁴

Aristotle presented an explanation of social evolution in terms of utility, an expansion of the social nature, and the scope of the desire for, and need of, society.⁵ In this respect he made a considerable advance over Plato, who had adopted the utilitarian and economic explanation, almost to the exclusion of the instinctive basis. However, while Aristotle's interpretation was more inclusive and well-balanced, he fell far short of the thoroughness of Plato in his analysis of the economic foundations of society.

In his criticism of Plato's communistic scheme he advanced arguments against communism, which for completeness and scientific accuracy leave little to be said upon the subject.⁶ But his own project for an ideal commonwealth was not much more satisfactory than that of Plato, for both were permeated with the Greek ideals of exclusiveness, provincialism, and localism, and with the notions that social stability was the end most to be sought in the institutions of society,⁷ and that society was prior to the individual in importance.⁸

¹ Cf. Robinson, *History of Western Europe*, p. 272.

² Cf. Pollock, *A History of the Science of Politics*, p. 16.

³ *Politics*, Jowett's translation, i, 2.

⁵ *Ibid.*, i, 1-2.

⁴ *Ibid.*, i, 1-2; iii, 6, 9.

⁶ *Ibid.*, ii, 2-7.

⁷ *Ibid.*, vii, 4-15; Bury, *History of Greece*, p. 835; Loos, *op. cit.*, pp. 145-76.

⁸ *Politics*, i, 2; *Republic*, v, 310.

The subjective basis of society Aristotle believed to be embodied in friendship, in the analysis of which he approached Professor Giddings' theory of the "consciousness of kind."¹

Finally, Aristotle gave a more complete statement than Plato of the organic analogy² and of the influence of physical environment upon society. In his theory of the effect of the physical environment Aristotle revived and adapted the theories of Hippocrates, so as to furnish a geographical basis for the alleged superiority of the Greeks. He held that by their intermediate geographical situation the Greeks were able to combine the superior mental attainments of southern peoples with the greater bravery of the northerners, and at the same time to escape the fickleness of the inhabitants of warm regions and the stupidity of the people of the north.³ The common ancient and mediaeval doctrine of the general superiority of the inhabitants of the temperate climates was, in all probability, but the statement of an observed fact. Their explanation of this fact, however, was hardly as satisfactory, being based upon the fantastic astrological doctrine of planetary influences and the equally grotesque Greek physical philosophy, with its physiological chemistry founded on the theory of the four elements and the four humors.

The distinctive sociological characteristics of the Stoic and Epicurean social philosophy are not difficult to account for on the basis of the conditions of the time. The swallowing up of the Greek city-states in the imperial system of Alexander and the disorder which followed the disintegration of his empire naturally led, on the one hand, to the cosmopolitan serenity and resignation of the Stoics, and, on the other, to the individualistic and materialistic doctrines of the Epicureans who valued society and the state solely for their aid in securing a superior degree of convenience and safety.⁴

¹ *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. by Peters, VIII, i, ix, xiv; IX, xii.

² *Politics*, iv, 4.

³ *Ibid.*, vii, 7. For Barker's excellent analysis of Aristotle's political and social theories, see *op. cit.*, pp. 208-496, and for the later influence of the *Politics*, *ibid.*, pp. 497-524. Cf. also Duprat, "Rapport des doctrines politiques anciennes avec la sociologie et la politique contemporaines," in *Revue Internationale de Sociologie*, 1901, pp. 818 ff., and Loos, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-176.

⁴ Cf. Zeller, *Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics*, chap. ii.

The Stoics, who constituted that school of philosophy founded by Zeno (*ca.* 350–*ca.* 260 B.C.) in the latter half of the fourth century B.C., and which lasted until the close of the period of the domination of the Western Roman Empire, interpreted society in terms of rational thought and held with Aristotle that all men must be social, both for the development of their own personality and for the proper discharge of their duties toward their fellow-beings. Their conception of society was far broader than that of the other schools of Greek philosophy, to whom the world was either Greek or barbarian, and the cosmopolitan Stoic conception of a world-society and citizenship did much to develop the idea of the essential brotherhood of mankind. Especially important in their ethical doctrines was their emphasis upon the law of nature as the proper guide for moral conduct.¹

The Epicureans, founded by Epicurus (342–270 B.C.), presented a conception of society diametrically opposed to that held by the Stoics, maintaining that it had its only basis in conscious self-interest, which led to the institution of social relations in order to escape the evils and inconveniences of a non-social and isolated condition. Such a theory, it will easily be perceived, was based on that fallacious conception of society which opened the way for the later development of the doctrine of the presocial state of nature and the foundation of social relations in a contract based upon the perception of the utility of such an arrangement. With the possible exception of the Sophists² and Plato,³ Epicurus was the first to premise an original contract, though it was more after the nature of the governmental than the social contract.⁴ Thus, as compared with the cosmopolitan and idealistic Stoics, the Epicureans were marked individualists and evolutionary materialists, though they were by no means advocates of sensuality, as is often asserted.⁵

¹ Janet, *op. cit.*, I, 239–50; Zeller, *Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics*, 1891, pp. 311–40; Scherger, *The Evolution of Modern Liberty*, pp. 18–22; Stein, *Die Sociale Frage im Lichte der Philosophie*, pp. 218–28; and the extracts given in Bakewell, *A Source-Book of Ancient Philosophy*, pp. 269–89.

² *Supra*, pp. 178.

³ *Laws*, iii, 683–84.

⁴ The significant passages from Epicurus are preserved in Diogenes Laertius, *Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers*, Book X, chap. xxxi, secs. 33–35.

⁵ Bakewell, *op. cit.*, pp. 290–304; Zeller, *op. cit.*, pp. 490–98; Stein, *op. cit.*, pp. 228–30; Janet, *op. cit.*, pp. 235 f.; Giddings, *Sociology, a Lecture*, p. 17.

Polybius (203-121 B.C.), the Greek student of Roman history, is usually overlooked by students of the history of social philosophy, but he is, nevertheless, one of the most important figures in the development of that subject. His conception of social evolution was in the main accurate. He premised the aggregation and association of primitive men as resulting from a sense of weakness and a perception of likeness. Government, he believed, arose in force and was rendered permanent by the increasing reflective action of the social mind as it gradually perceived more clearly the utility of political relations.¹ This was the argument advanced by Hume nineteen centuries later in his assault upon the doctrine of a social contract.² Polybius also made an important contribution in assigning the origin of morality and justice to the group approval or disapproval of certain practices and modes of conduct.³ In this he suggested a line of treatment exploited by writers like Bagehot and Sumner. Polybius put forth the first clear statement of the theory of reflective sympathy later developed by Spinoza, Hume, and Adam Smith.⁴ Again, he was the first writer on political science who proposed to secure liberty and governmental stability through a system of checks and balances in political organization.⁵ Finally, Polybius presented one of the clearest statements of the prevalent classical conception of the cyclical nature of the historical process—a view taken up by Machiavelli and recently revived by Le Bon and Gumpłowicz.⁶

III. SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY AMONG THE ROMANS

Polybius was the last great Greek social philosopher.⁷ The minds of the Romans were of a legal and practical character, little given to constructive speculative philosophy. Their contribution was to advance political organization and legal development, not to formulate theories of the state and of society.⁸ The Romans, in

¹ *History of Rome*, trans. by Schuckburgh, vi, 5-6. See the selections in Coker, *Readings in Political Philosophy*, pp. 106-17.

² *Infra*, pp. 231 f.

³ *History*, *ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *History*, vi, 11-15.

⁶ Cf. Bury, *The Ancient Greek Historians*, pp. 205 ff.; 248.

⁷ One might call attention in passing to the Greek geographer Strabo, whose contributions to descriptive sociology and the theory of physical environment were by no means insignificant.

⁸ Cf. Pollock, *op. cit.*, pp. 31-32.

building up a world-empire, came into contact with many different legal codes, and this stimulating "contact of cultures" led to the formulation of theories of the origin and nature of laws in general.¹

While the Romans contributed little to social philosophy in the way of original theories, it is among the Roman followers of the later Greek schools of philosophy, such as the Stoics and Epicureans, that one must look for the most complete statement of those doctrines that has been preserved, since several of the Roman writers "adapted Greek principles with considerable ingenuity."²

The chief Roman representative of the Epicurean school was the great philosophic poet Lucretius (99-55 B.C.), the most original mind that Rome produced.³ Acknowledging with pride his obligations to Epicurus, he justified, by his original presentation of the course of human and social development, the title of the first great evolutionary sociologist.⁴ Correlating the current written and spoken accounts of the customs of primitive peoples with the previous theories of poets and philosophers, he produced a theory of social evolution in all its aspects which was infinitely superior to anything which was presented by any other writer down to the critical period of eighteenth-century philosophy. The struggle for existence; the survival of the fittest; the mode of life among primitive peoples; the origin of language, fire, industry, religion, domestic relations, and the arts of pleasure; the sequence of the culture ages, and the development of commercial relations are set forth with a clearness, accuracy, and modernity which precludes the possibility of entire conjecture or of the complete reading into his writings of later ideas which did not occur to him.⁵

But, powerful a thinker as was Lucretius, he had little influence upon posterity, Horace being the only later Roman writer who was much affected by Epicurean principles. The Epicurean theories

¹ Marvin, *op. cit.*, chap. v.

² Cf. Teuffel and Schwabe, *A History of Roman Literature*, I, pp. 1-2, 77-87.

³ On Lucretius, see the pretentious commentary of Masson, *Lucretius, Epicurean and Poet* (London, 1907-9, 2 vols.).

⁴ Haddon, *History of Anthropology*, pp. 122-24.

⁵ Lucretius, *De rerum natura*, trans. by Munro, Bohn's Library, v, 325 ff; 778 ff.

were too rationalistic and dynamic for the Roman mind to grasp and were even more repugnant to the Christian writers, owing to their denunciation of "religio" as the chief cause of human misery. So it is to Cicero, a would-be eclectic with strong Stoic leanings, and to Seneca, an avowed Stoic, that one must turn for an exposition of the general political and social philosophy of the Romans.

Cicero (106-43 B.C.) followed Plato in attempting to describe an ideal commonwealth, but he did not feel the need of constructing a plan for a utopian society, since he considered that the Roman commonwealth possessed all the essential characteristics of a perfect state. He accepted Aristotle's dictum of the natural sociability of man rather than the Epicurean doctrine that society results from a sense of weakness in isolation or a perception of the utility of association, but he did emphasize the advantages of associated life while denying that they furnish the basic cause of society.¹ He also agreed with Aristotle as to the value of friendship and like-mindedness as the psychological basis of association.² From the Stoics he derived his doctrine of the brotherhood of man, and from Polybius he appropriated the theories regarding the classification and cycles of government and the value of checks and balances.³ In short, it was the summing up of the various contemporary social theories into a coherent body of thought that constituted Cicero's main achievement.

Seneca (3 B.C.-65 A.D.) is the next systematic social philosopher after Cicero among the Romans. The chief difference between the two, as far as social philosophy is concerned, was Seneca's revival of the ancient Greek conception of the primitive stage of society as a golden age⁴ which was followed by the period of the origin of the conventional institutions of society as a remedy for the evils which crept in and brought the golden age to an end. In this age of "golden innocence" mankind lived without coercive authority,

¹ *De officiis*, trans. by Edmonds, Bohn's Library, I, xvii, xlv; *De republica*, trans. by Yonge, Bohn's Library, I, xxv-xxvi. For the effect of Cicero's position on this point on mediaeval political theory cf. Gierke, *Political Theories of the Middle Ages*, trans. by Maitland, n. 306.

² *De officiis*, I, xvii.

³ *De republica*, I, xiv.

⁴ Cf. Bury, *The Ancient Greek Historians*, p. 187.

gladly obeying the wise, and without any distinctions of property or caste. The main cause for the breakdown of this primitive arrangement was the origin of private property. The people became dissatisfied with common ownership, and the resulting lust after wealth and authority rendered necessary the institution of political authority to curb these growing evil propensities.¹ The importance of this doctrine is not its enunciation by Seneca, but its adoption by the Christian Fathers. They identified it with the state of man before the "Fall," and thus reinforced the already extremely retrospective character of Christian social philosophy which rendered any dynamic conception of human progress impossible.²

The Stoic doctrines among the Romans reached their highest development in Epictetus³ (about 90 A.D.) and in the emperor Marcus Aurelius⁴ (121-180 A.D.). In fact, the loss of the Greek originals have made these two writers the main sources for the Stoic doctrines of society which were presented above.

Another philosophic development among the Romans which had important consequences in the history of sociology was neo-Platonism, which found its main representative in Plotinus (204-270 A.D.) With its renunciation of the world of sense and its tendencies toward unlimited credulity and hostility to rationalism or skepticism, it furnished the general intellectual setting which was adopted by patristic and mediaeval theology and thus militated strongly against any movement toward a rational conception of social processes and institutions. Neo-Platonism, the conception of a former golden age, and the eschatological view of society, which was drawn as much from the pagan mysteries as from Christian texts, all combined to make up the unhealthy mental environment in which Christian theology and social philosophy flourished.⁵

¹ *Epistularum Moralium ad Lucilium*, ed. by Haase, xiv, 2; *The Epistles of Lucius Annaeus Seneca*, trans. by Morell (London, 1786, 2 vols.), II, 115-36, Letter XC.

² Cf. Carlyle, *A History of Medieval Political Theory*, I, 24-25, 117, 127-28.

³ *Enchiridion et Dissertationes*, trans. by Long in Bohn's Library.

⁴ *Meditations*, also translated by Long; some significant selections from these writers are given by Bakewell, *op. cit.*, pp. 316-39.

⁵ Cf. Harnack, *History of Dogma*, I, Appendix, 336 ff.; and Whittaker, *The Neo-Platonists*; for selections from Plotinus, see Bakewell, *op. cit.*, pp. 340-93.

Julius Caesar in his *Commentaries*¹ and Tacitus² in his description of the Germans presented studies in descriptive sociology and ethnology which were hardly surpassed until the very recent studies of primitive culture areas by trained ethnologists. As is the case with Herodotus, recent critical historical investigations have tended to confirm rather than to question the main contentions of both Caesar and Tacitus.

Cicero³ and Vitruvius⁴ revived the environmental theories of Hippocrates and Aristotle and restated them so as to utilize the arguments to support the contention that the gods had favored the location of Rome beyond all other places. This doctrine of the general superiority of peoples situated in middle latitudes was handed down through the Middle Ages in the writings of Vegetius, Paul the Deacon, Aquinas, and Ibn Khaldun and received a systematic exposition in the *Republique* of Bodin.

Finally, there must be noted the important conception developed by the Roman lawyers regarding the origin and nature of political authority. It is the opinion of recent and reliable authorities that from the second to the sixth centuries A.D. there was but one legal theory of the origin of this authority, and that was that it had its foundation in the consent of the people. However remote from popular consent might be the method by which the emperor at any time arose to power, the theory remained the same. That this conception had a very great influence upon the later developments of the theory of a social, and especially of a governmental, contract, and popular sovereignty, is beyond doubt.⁵

IV. THE SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY OF EARLY AND PATRISTIC CHRISTIANITY

The view of the founders of Christianity in regard to the nature of society was not fundamentally different from that of the Stoics, namely, the brotherhood of man in the spirit of God. However, the Christians were a little more universal and democratic in their

¹ Cf. Holmes, *Julius Caesar's Conquest of Gaul*.

² Cf. Boissier, *Tacitus*, trans. by Hutchison.

³ Cicero *De republica* i. 3.

⁴ *The Ten Books on Architecture*, trans. by Morgan, Book VI, chap. i.

⁵ Cf. Carlyle, *op. cit.*, pp. 63-77; Willoughby, *op. cit.*, pp. 231-44; Dunning, *op. cit.*, pp. 125-29.

doctrine, since the Stoics had in reality meant the brotherhood of the wise or of those who could participate through their reason in the divine logos. Christianity tended to break down this useful distinction between the wise and the ignorant and to emphasize the possibility of participation in universal brotherhood through the medium of faith and belief rather than through the exercise of reason.¹

The social doctrines of Jesus were embodied in the highly idealistic and plastic exhortations to love, service, and recognition of human brotherhood, and were not reduced, or intended to be reduced, to any rigid scheme of dogmas or ritual, and were on that account all the more valuable and adjustable to changing conditions.² It was inevitable, however, that, when the attempt was made to put these lofty ideals into operation on a large scale and to perfect an ecclesiastical organization, they would be compressed into the narrow bounds of dogmatic interpretation and ritualistic expression from which they have not yet escaped, and which through a greater part of the history of Christendom have been perverted from a means to an end into an end in themselves.

The first, and perhaps the greatest, figure in this movement was St. Paul. He proclaimed the doctrine of love, the organic nature of society, and the necessity of civil government to repress evil; but at the same time he was busy instructing the "brethren" in matters of creed and organization, and had instituted that greatest of Christian rites—the Eucharist.³ St. Paul initiated the movement, which was carried on by the Fathers until, by the fifth century A.D., the doctrines of Jesus had been perverted from a few plastic ideals to that rigid, dogmatic, ritualistic, and eschatological system of creed and organization known as mediaeval Christianity.⁴

¹ Bury, *The Ancient Greek Historians*, p. 239; Scherger, *op. cit.*, pp. 18-22; Carlyle, *op. cit.*, pp. 83-85; Janet, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 278-79; Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, p. 360.

² Shailer Matthews, *The Social Teachings of Jesus*, pp. 16, 115, 151; Stevens, *The Teachings of Jesus*, pp. 117-18. For opinions and alignment of authorities upon the much-discussed problem of whether the Kingdom of God was an earthly social conception or eschatological, see Schmidt, *The Prophet of Nazareth*, pp. 32, 296 ff.; Stevens, *op. cit.*, pp. 65, 166.

³ Carlyle, *op. cit.*, pp. 89-90, 97-98; Conybeare, *Myth, Magic, and Morals*, chaps. i, xiv.

⁴ Cf. Bury, *A History of the Freedom of Thought*, chap. iii.

Yet, in spite of its crudities and misconceptions, the modern writer must not fail to recognize the very great importance and significance of the Roman Catholic church in mediaeval life. Through its elaborate sacramental system it provided the primitive European mind with an effective instrument for meeting and successfully dealing with the dangers, mysteries, and perplexities of existence.¹

The Christian Fathers, as a source of religious dogma and authority hardly second to the Scriptures, are most important in the history of social philosophy. While their doctrines cover some six centuries, nevertheless their thoughts possess sufficient coherence to allow the patristic period to be discussed as a whole.² The fundamental doctrines of the Fathers upon the origin, nature, and end of society may be summarized under the following propositions: (1) Mankind is by nature social; society thus being a natural product in agreement with the ideas of Aristotle and the Stoics. (2) Seneca's "golden" state of nature, with an absence of coercive government, was identified with the state of man before the "Fall." (3) Civil government was rendered necessary by that "Fall" as a remedy for the crimes and vices of mankind. (4) While government was thus rendered necessary by the "Fall," nevertheless it was a divine institution devised to curb further evil, and hence the rulers derived their power from God, were the agents of God, and rebellion was a sin. (5) Whatever practical value social institutions might have in rendering more enduring this earthly life, their service was only fleeting and, at best, immeasurably less important than preparation for the institutions of the heavenly kingdom. Thus social reform or progress was regarded as relatively unimportant, and it was held that one might better endure social inconveniences than to jeopardize his salvation by dissipating his energy in attempting to improve earthly conditions.³ Their theory that the poor were a part of the divine order, provided as a means to advance the spiritual welfare of alms-givers,

¹ J. T. Shotwell, *Unpublished Lectures on Paganism and Christianity*.

² Carlyle, *op. cit.*, p. 102.

³ Justin Martyr, "First Apology," in *Ante-Nicene Fathers*, Vol. I, chap. xvii; Irenaeus, "Against Heresies," *ibid.*, Vol. I, Book V, chap. xxiv, sec. 1; Lactantius,

dominated the methods of charity and relief until the English Poor Law of 1834.

The eschatological conception, with its disregard for earthly values and institutions, found its highest development in Augustine's *City of God* (written 413-426). Here the doctrine was set forth with great vigor, and the only criterion set up for measuring the excellence of human institutions was the aid or hindrance which they offered to the attainment of heavenly salvation.¹

V. MEDIAEVAL SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

The social philosophy of the mediaeval period grew naturally out of the elements which were fused in the development of mediaeval civilization. From the Romans there came the conception, most clearly expressed by Seneca, of the conventional or artificial nature of social institutions as a result of the descent from a primitive golden age; and the doctrines of the lawyers upholding the idea of popular sovereignty and popular consent as the basis of imperial power. From Christianity came the notion of the "Fall," which harmonized well with the pagan conception of the descent from a golden age; the doctrine of the divine character of political authority; and the dogma of the independence or autonomy of the spiritual or religious life. The new states of Northern Europe contributed the notion that political authority was but the delegated authority of the whole community, thus agreeing with, and giving added emphasis to, the legal theory of the Roman lawyers in regard to popular sovereignty.² Again, the Christian conception of the

"Divine Institutes," *ibid.*, Vol. VII, Book VI, chap. x; "The Workmanship of God," *ibid.*, Vol. VII, chap. iv; Tertullian, "Scorpiace," *ibid.*, Vol. III, chap. xiv; "Apology," Vol. III, chap. xxiv; Athanasius, "Against the Heathen," in *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, Vol. IV, sec. 2; Ambrose, "De officiis," *ibid.*, Vol. X, Book I, chap. xxviii; Augustine, "On the Good of Marriage," *ibid.*, Vol. III, sec. 1; "The City of God," *ibid.*, Vol. II, Book V, chap. xix, Book XIX, chaps. v, xv; St. Jerome, letter quoted in Robinson, *Readings in European History*, I, 86-87; Gregory the Great, "Pastoral Rule," in *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, Vol. XII, Book I, chap. iii; Isadore of Seville, *Etymologies*, XV, 2; Carlyle, *op. cit.*, chaps. viii-xv; Gierke, *op. cit.*, notes, 16-18, 137.

¹ See especially Book XIX, chap. xvii.

² These diverse sources of mediaeval political theory are admirably summarized by Carlyle, "The Sources of Medieval Political Theory," in the *American Historical Review*, October 1913, pp. 1-12; and more elaborately analyzed in his *History of Medieval Political Theory*, Vol. I, *passim*, and Vol. III, Introduction.

brotherhood of man and the organic unity of Christendom, together with the sharp differentiation of classes in the mediaeval period into ecclesiastics, princes, warriors, and laborers, tended to revive the platonic view of the organic unity of society as based upon the division of labor.¹ The revival of Aristotle by the Scholastics in the later Middle Ages introduced Aristotle's emphasis upon the natural sociability of man and led to that final harmony and synthesis of the mediaeval period which maintained that, while society was a natural product, government was also necessary and natural in order to lend safety and stability to society. These are the chief tendencies in mediaeval social philosophy. Attention may now be turned to the individual presentation of these doctrines and to a consideration of their variations in different periods.²

There was little advance in social philosophy from the sixth to the ninth century. While the term Middle Ages has now been relegated to the field of rhetoric, there can be no doubt of the reality of the term Dark Ages, which applies to the period between the beginning of the barbarian invasions and the intellectual revival of the ninth century, represented by such men as Agobard of Lyons, Rhabanus Maurus, Hincmar of Rheims, and John Scotus Erigena.³

As far as there was any interest in the subject of social and political philosophy, the views of the Fathers were adopted without question in the encyclopedic compilations of the time; the chief authority of the period being Isadore of Seville (d. 636), who was a transitional figure between the patristic period and the Dark Ages. The chief practical political problem was the adjustment of the

¹ This fundamental, but often overlooked, phase of mediaeval social philosophy is ably presented by Ernest Barker in his article on "Medieval Ideas of Unity," in *The Unity of Western Civilization*, ed. by F. S. Marvin (Oxford, 1915), pp. 91-212.

² Marvin, *The Living Past*, chap. vi. To get a proper conception of the mental atmosphere of the Middle Ages, which is essential to any comprehension of the social philosophy of the period, one should consult Taylor, *The Classical Heritage of the Middle Ages*, pp. 18-56; Dill, *Roman Society in the Last Century of the Empire*, Book V; Taylor, *The Medieval Mind*, Vol. I, chaps. iii-v; and Poole, *Illustrations of the History of Medieval Thought*. The chief sources of mediaeval social philosophy are tabulated by Gierke, *Political Theories of the Middle Ages*, pp. lxii-lxxvii.

³ See Shotwell article, "Middle Ages," in 11th edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*; Taylor, *The Medieval Mind*, I, chap. x.

division of power between state and church. The Fathers had prepared the ground for this struggle by their acceptance of St. Paul's doctrine that government was a divine institution. But the church was also divine, and thus arose the problem of deciding the primacy of the claims of two institutions, each with divine and hence infinite powers. The adjustment of the relations between these "two powers" absorbed also the main interest of the writers of this period and later culminated in the extreme theocratic view of the state as presented in the *Polycraticus* of John of Salisbury, and in the defense of imperial authority by Peter DuBois and Marsiglio of Padua.¹

Even the intellectual awakening of the ninth century contributed little to social theory. The writers accepted the common tradition of a primitive state of nature, full of disorder and inconveniences, to remedy which political authority was instituted.²

In the eleventh and twelfth centuries, however, there were interesting new developments. The revival of Roman law brought with it theories of popular sovereignty, and the canon law revived the patristic conception of a primitive golden age followed by the "Fall," which rendered political organization essential for the preservation of order.³

The fiery priest Manegold of Lautenbach (d. after 1085), in his defence of Gregory VII, clearly enunciated the principle of a governmental compact as the basis of political authority, apparently for the first time in the history of Western Europe, though his statement was but the definite formulation of the general theory of the time.⁴ Tyranny was defined as the breaking of the original contract by which the ruler was appointed, and it constituted a valid basis for rebellion.⁵

¹ For this period, see Littlejohn, *The Political Theory of the Schoolmen and Grotius* (1896), Part I, pp. 11-48; though somewhat diffuse, this work is the most complete exposition in English of the scholastic political and social theory.

² Cf. Carlyle, *History of Medieval Political Theory*, I, 211-12; Littlejohn, *op. cit.*, pp. 26-33.

³ Cf. *Ibid.*, II, 56-74; 143-44.

⁴ Carlyle, *American Historical Review*, October, 1913, p. 8, and *History of Medieval Political Theory*, III, 160-69.

⁵ Poole, *op. cit.*, p. 232; Littlejohn, *op. cit.*, p. 33; Gierke, *op. cit.*, nn. 130, 138.

The theocratic doctrine of the state received its fullest exposition in the *Polycraticus* of John of Salisbury (1120-82), an English churchman who had studied under Abelard. The inferiority of the prince to the priest is emphasized at great length, tyranny is defined, and tyrannicide is justified. In addition to this he outlined the most detailed analogy between the individual organism and the state that had yet been produced.¹

The period of Scholastic political philosophy began in its true sense in the thirteenth century, with the work of Albertus Magnus (1193-1280). It had its origin in the introduction of the works of Aristotle through the medium of the Arab civilization of Spain and in the desire to give the Christian theology a systematic philosophical expression, for which purpose the philosophy of Aristotle was admirably adapted. Albertus incorporated the *Politics* of Aristotle in his commentary upon political problems and opened the way for the work of his greater pupil, St. Thomas Aquinas, the most noted of the Scholastic writers.²

While Aquinas (1227-74) died at the early age of forty-six, he left a tremendous mass of writings, of which his *De regimine principum* (completed by Aegidius Romanus) was one of the most suggestive and systematic of the treatises on social and political philosophy that appeared during mediaeval times. As a scholastic philosopher he naturally accepted the dictum of Aristotle regarding the inherent sociability of man. Civil society comprehends three ideas: first, that man is by nature social; secondly, that in society there is a community of purpose and interest, since only through social relations can man realize his own best interests; and, thirdly,

¹ Carlyle, *History of Medieval Political Theory*, III, 126 f., 136 ff.; Gierke, *op. cit.*, p. 24, and n. 76; Littlejohn, *op. cit.*, pp. 42-47. It must be borne in mind that these mediaeval analogies were purely anthropomorphic and not genetically related to the later biological analogies.

What was, perhaps, an even more extreme statement of the ecclesiastical claim for the primacy of the church over the civil power was embodied in the *Summa de potestate ecclesiastica* of Augustinus Triumphus, written in the fourteenth century during the papal "captivity" at Avignon. However, this had little practical significance, for, as Professor Dunning has well remarked, the papal pretensions increased about in proportion to the decline of their actual powers.

² Littlejohn, *op. cit.*, pp. 39-42.

that a superior power is necessary in society to direct it for the common good, and that the ruler may thus utilize his superior talent for the benefit of the community.¹ The state had its origin primarily in the natural patriarchal rule of the heads of families, but in order to form extensive and efficient political organizations it was necessary to delegate this power to a common superior through a governmental compact.² But Aquinas proceeded to prove his true scholastic spirit by blending with the primarily Aristotelian theory the dogmas of the church that political authority came ultimately from God alone, though he might confer it through the medium of the people, and its corollary that political power was inferior to the spiritual.³ Again, he denied that the city-state was the ideal political organization and made a step in the direction of Machiavelli in declaring his preference for a province made up of several cities.⁴ He also followed John of Salisbury in outlining the organic analogy in the state,⁵ and his theories regarding the influences of climate and environment upon society embodied the tradition common to classical times and handed down in the works of Aristotle and Vegetius, with some original comments by himself.⁶ Finally, Aquinas achieved rather questionable fame by his influence in formulating the rigid rules for economic transactions which were highly obstructive to mediæval trade and industry.⁷

Dante (1265-1321) offered some interesting suggestions in his plan for a universal monarchy, co-ordinate in authority with the church, and designed to put an end to international strife, to the

¹ *De regimine principum*, I, i; Littlejohn, *op. cit.*, pp. 69-74; 84-87; 104-8; Crahay, *La Politique de Saint Thomas d'Aquin* (1896), chaps. i-ii. See the selections given by Coker, *Readings in Political Philosophy*, pp. 123-35, particularly pp. 129-33.

² Littlejohn, *op. cit.*, pp. 84-85; Coker, *op. cit.*, pp. 129 ff.

³ Littlejohn, *op. cit.*, pp. 117, 144 ff.; Gierke, *op. cit.*, nn. 98, 100; Crahay, *op. cit.*, chaps. iii, v.

⁴ *De regimine*, I, i; Dunning, *op. cit.*, pp. 197-98; Littlejohn, *op. cit.*, pp. 91-103; Crahay, *op. cit.*, chap. iv.

⁵ Littlejohn, *op. cit.*, p. 90; Gierke, *op. cit.*, p. 25, n. 81.

⁶ *De regimine*, II, i-iv; Littlejohn, *op. cit.*, pp. 92-96.

⁷ Littlejohn, *op. cit.*, pp. 177-94; Haney, *A History of Economic Thought*, pp. 75-78.

end "that society might realize its function of unhampered exercise of the intellectual faculties of man in speculation and action."¹ Further, in *The Banquet*, Dante presents an interesting interpretation of the process of imitation. In discussing how fame and notoriety develop, he illustrates how imitation develops in a geometric ratio and is refracted by its media.²

Dante, with his co-ordination of state and church, in his doctrines was midway between Aquinas and Peter DuBois (1255-1321) and Marsiglio of Padua (1270-1342).

Peter DuBois, in his *De recuperatione terre sancte*, defended Philip the Fair in his struggle with Boniface VIII and warned the Pope not to meddle with temporal affairs, since such interference in the past had cost the Christians the possession of the Holy Land. He outlined a general program of social reform in which, among other enlightening suggestions, he advocated international arbitration to settle disputes between nations.³

Marsiglio in his *Defensor pacis*, the most modern and original work produced during the mediaeval period, attacked the church with something of the spirit and modernity of Voltaire. He declared that the priests were merely the ministers of salvation, and denied that they possessed the power of forgiving sins or the right to interfere in temporal matters.⁴

In his strictly social and political philosophy Marsiglio was also highly original. He accounted for the origin of society on a utilitarian basis. Society was essential to mankind for the carrying on of those co-operative activities necessary to existence and comfort. But unregulated society was likely to degenerate into disorder, and hence civil government was indispensable. This political authority

¹ *De monarchia*, ed. and trans. by Henry (1904); Littlejohn, *op. cit.*, pp. 219-28.

² *The Banquet*, trans. by Hillard (1889), Book I, chap. iii, sec. 2. For an excellent summary of the mediaeval ideas of the organic unity of society which culminated in Aquinas and Dante, see Barker, "Medieval Ideas of Unity," in *The Unity of Western Civilization*, ed. by F. S. Marvin, pp. 91-121.

³ F. M. Powicke, "Pierre DuBois, a Medieval Radical," in *Historical Essays of Owens College, Manchester*, ed. by Tout and Tait (1907), pp. 169-91; Figgis, *From Gerson to Grotius* (1916 ed.), pp. 31-32.

⁴ Cf. selections from the *Defensor pacis*, given in Robinson, *Readings in European History*, I, 495-97; Gierke, *op. cit.*, p. 51 and n. 182.

was merely delegated by the people, in whose hands reposed sovereign power.¹ Marsiglio also emphasized the unity of society by outlining the organic analogy in an original way in which the six estates or professions were made to correspond to the organs in the individual organism.² Further, by his separation of politics from theology, Marsiglio made an advance toward Machiavelli's separation of ethics from politics.

Finally, Nicholas of Cues (1401-64) and Aeneas Sylvius (1404-64) fittingly closed the mediaeval period by presenting the most perfect development of two of its most characteristic social and political doctrines.

The former in his *De concordatio catholica* presented the most elaborate development of the analogy between the organism and the state that had yet appeared. He also introduced the conception of political pathology and, reviving the platonic figure, designated the ruler as the physician-in-chief to the sick state, prescribing for its ills according to the best advice of political philosophers, past and present.³ In the more strictly political aspects of his theories Nicholas emphasized the doctrine of consent as the basis of political authority and outlined an original scheme of representation in government.⁴

Aeneas Sylvius (1405-64), in his *De ortu et auctoritate imperii Romani*, advanced the clearest distinction between the social and the governmental contracts that is to be found in the writings of a mediaeval author.⁵

VI. EARLY MODERN SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

The social philosophy of the early modern period had its definite environmental basis. The travels and explorations in the Old and New Worlds had provided an even more extensive field for the contact of cultures than had existed at the time of the

¹ *Defensor pacis*, Book I; see selections in Coker, *Readings in Political Philosophy*, pp. 160-67; Littlejohn, *op. cit.*, pp. 228-36; Gierke, *op. cit.*, pp. 47 f., and nn. 155, 170, 267.

² Littlejohn, *op. cit.*, p. 230; Gierke, *op. cit.*, pp. 28-29, nn. 99, 302.

³ Gierke, *op. cit.*, p. 24, n. 79.

⁴ Gierke, *op. cit.*, pp. 47, 66, nn. 171, 234, 238.

⁵ *De ortu*, chaps. i-ii; Gierke, *op. cit.*, n. 306; Dunning, *op. cit.*, pp. 282-83.

expansion of Rome and introduced a large number of new ideas and customs. The Commercial Revolution, which brought in on a moderate scale the dynamic force of capital, tended to disintegrate the stability, routine, and provincialism of the mediaeval rural economy. The new stock of capital enabled the rulers to command a paid officialdom and army and thus to reduce to subjection the recalcitrant feudal lords and to establish the first centralized and unified national states. Hence the theories of two men so different in many ways as Machiavelli and Sir Thomas More have a common social background. One reflected the "conspirital" society, which grew out of an already disintegrated mediaeval social order, and presented a practical plan for its reconstruction; the other wrote as a critic of the process whereby the new order was being established and suggested a more equitable and humane method. In the theories of Bodin, who wrote as a citizen of the most perfectly unified of the new national states, one finds an investigation of the origin, nature, and justification of the new political and social order. *In this respect Bodin pointed the way for the main center of orientation of social philosophy for the next two centuries.* The most important fact to bear in mind in regard to the social background of the theory of this period is that the more progressive historians have unquestionably demonstrated that it was the Commercial Revolution, rather than the Renaissance or the Reformation, which destroyed the mediaeval order and laid the foundations of the modern era.¹

It is perhaps typical of the process whereby mediaeval civilization was disintegrated by the intrusion of elements from without, to find that the first writer to possess the modern dynamic ideas of progress and the unity of the social process was the Arab historian and statesman *Ibn Khaldun* (1332-1406). At the outset in his *Prolegomena to Universal History*, which is the systematic exposition of his theoretical views, he draws a sharp distinction between the popular episodic history and history as he conceives of it—namely,

¹ Marvin, *The Living Past*, chap. vii; Cunningham, *Western Civilization*, II, 162-224; Hayes, *Political and Social History of Modern Europe*, I, 27-73.

as a science tracing the origin and development of civilization.¹ Man, he maintains, is by nature social, since his wants are so varied and extensive that they can be supplied only through co-operative effort. But the conflict of desires produces quarrels and leads to the necessity of instituting government to insure order and stability.² With almost the emphasis of Professor Giddings, he insists upon the necessity of homogeneity for the existence of a stable state.³ His analysis of the tribal society of the Arabs was probably unsurpassed as a study of this period of human society until the time of Morgan.⁴ Again, his analysis of the influence of physical environment upon society was more thorough than any other study of this subject until the time of Bodin, if not until that of Montesquieu.⁵ But the most important of the innovations of this interesting writer was his grasp of the unity and continuity of the historical process. In sharp contrast to the static conceptions of the prevailing Christian historiography, he grasped that fundamental conception that the stages of civilization are in a constant process of change, like the life of the individual. He pointed out clearly the co-operation of psychic and environmental factors in this process of historical development.⁶ All in all, Khaldun rather than Vico has the best claim to the honor of having founded the philosophy of history, and his view of the factors involved in the historical process was sounder and more modern than that of the Italian of three centuries later.⁷

The greatest social philosopher of the period conventionally known as the Renaissance, but which has been superseded in the terminology of the more progressive historians by idea of the Commercial Revolution, was Nicolo Machiavelli (1469-1527). He

¹ *Prolégomènes historiques d'Ibn Khaldun*, trans. by M.G. De Slane, in *Notices et extraits des manuscrits de la bibliothèque impériale*, Vols. XIX-XXI (Paris, 1862-68), XIX, 4.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 86-90, 291 ff.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 270 ff., 291 ff., 318 ff.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 90 ff.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 254-317.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 58-59, 90 ff., 270 ff., 324 ff.

⁷ Convenient summaries of the contributions of Khaldun are to be found in Flint, *History of the Philosophy of History in France*, pp. 158 ff.; and DeGreef, *Le Trans-formisme social*, pp. 115-18.

advanced beyond Plato and Aristotle in separating ethics from politics and proceeded to make one of the most acute analyses of human nature which is to be found in the history of social philosophy. A perfect child of the conspiratorial society which formed his political environment,¹ his analysis was frankly based upon the premise of man's intriguing self-interest and the insatiability of human desire as the mainsprings of all human activity. He further maintained that material prosperity is amply sufficient to satisfy this desire in so far as it can be quenched.² In his *Prince* and *Discourses* (the latter is the less well known, but by far the most valuable work) he logically deduced from these pessimistic views of human nature the methods which are to be followed by a successful ruler of a monarchy and of a republic, respectively. The former was the greatest sociological study of the phenomena of leadership and impression that had been made.³ Again, there was a beginning of a conception of social dynamics in his criticism of the ideals of social stability and localism as expressed by Plato and Aristotle, and in his dictum that a state must expand and develop or decay.⁴ Finally, Machiavelli took social philosophy out of the realm of abstract speculation and made a beginning toward putting it on the firm foundation of historical induction.⁵ But in spite of these contributions, Machiavelli's analysis of society was not synthetic

¹ Cf. Giddings, *Historical and Descriptive Sociology*, pp. 13, 52-54. Mention might be made here of Professor Giddings' ingenious attempt at a correlation between the different varieties of social and political theories and the type of population, which latter is in turn dependent upon the environmental conditions in which it develops. He thus finds a very definite environmental basis for not only the Machiavellian type of social theory but also for the group-conflict, legal-sovereignty, contract, natural-right, evolutionary, idealistic, and utopian theories, in fact, for all of the great historic attempts to interpret social and political processes; see his "A Theory of Social Causation," *Publications of the American Economic Association*, 3d series, Vol. V, No. 2, pp. 172-74; his article on "Sociology" in the *New International Encyclopedia*; and "The Concepts and Methods of Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology*, September, 1904, pp. 169-70.

² *Discourses*, trans. by Detmold, Book I, chap. xxxvii.

³ The best summary of Machiavelli's doctrines in this regard is to be found in Giddings, *Sociology, a Lecture*, pp. 18-19.

⁴ *Discourses*, Book I, chap. vi.

⁵ Cf. John Morley, "Machiavelli," in *Critical Miscellanies*, 4th series, pp. 1-53; and Fueter, *Histoire de l'historiographie moderne*, pp. 75-83.

or well balanced, and his work was rather a handbook of political motives and a guide for the self-seeking despot or an imperialistic republic than a systematic theory of society.¹

Sir Thomas More (1478-1535) was the leading North European social philosopher of the period of Machiavelli. He is noted for his incisive indictment of the political, economic, and social evils of his time, and more particularly for the ideal commonwealth which he outlined as a remedy for these evils. Though More's *Utopia* left more freedom to the individual than Plato's scheme, it seems that he regarded his plan as practicable, while Plato has admitted that his communistic ideal was not possible of realization in the present stage of human enlightenment. While the lofty moral tone of More is in sharp contrast with the cynicism of Machiavelli, the latter more faithfully reflected the tendencies of the period.²

The Protestant Reformation gave little impulse to a more critical or synthetic investigation of social phenomena. While the defection of the Protestants from the ecclesiastical organization of the church of Rome gave them a less effective organization for the crushing of the spirit and practice of free inquiry and generalization as to the basis of the social order, the Reformation was intellectually as retrogressive as Catholic Christianity. In fact, the "predestinarian anthropology" of Calvin was even more depressing than the older idea of the "Fall of Man," for it not only proclaimed the unspeakable depravity of man, but also emphasized the essential ineffectiveness of individual effort at improvement. Reason was denounced by Luther as seductive and dangerous and as incompatible with the proper exercise of religion. On the other hand, it is possible that the secession of the Protestant princes from the Empire made for individualism in political theory; and it is certain that the revival by the Protestants of the law of nature as a

¹ Dunning, *op. cit.*, pp. 293 ff. For an extremely critical analysis of Machiavelli, see Novicow, "Machiavel et la politique moderne," *Rev. Internat. Soc.* (1910), pp. 720-54.

² More's "Utopia," in Henry Morley's *Ideal Commonwealths* (1885), pp. 53-167; cf. Guthrie, *Socialism before the French Revolution*, chaps. ii-iii.

substitute for the ecclesiastical power as a check upon tyranny had an important influence upon the later development of the theories of the state of nature and natural rights.¹

The French publicist and philosopher Jean Bodin (1530-96) presented a peculiar mixture of blind obscurantism and brilliant contributions to political and social philosophy. His work in support of the witchcraft persecutions is as sorry a piece of bigotry and superstition as could well be imagined,² while his *A Method for the Easy Understanding of History*, and his *Six Books concerning the State* (*De republica libri sex*) were two of the most suggestive works on history and political theory that were written before the present period.

Bodin approached nearer to a synthetic exposition of the social process than any other writer had done since the time of Aristotle. He traced the genesis of society from an original family which expanded and dispersed, but in time was reunited through the operation of the social instinct and a perception of the utility of co-operative activity. Society, according to Bodin, was essentially a union of lesser constituent groups organized for the purpose of carrying on trade, worship, and similar activities. But while society itself might have had this peaceful origin, the state and sovereign power developed in force through the conquest of one group by another.³

It is not difficult to discern the similarity between Bodin's conception of the origin of the state and that held by Gumpłowicz and his school, and his definition of sovereignty as the "supreme power in a state unrestrained by law" is the starting-point of modern political science.⁴ In his doctrine of the single-family origin of society he followed Aristotle and anticipated Blackstone

¹ Cf. Robinson, *The New History*, pp. 117-18, and the article "Reformation" in the 11th ed. of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*; Dunning, *Political Theories from Luther to Montesquieu*, chap. i.

² Cf. Lecky, *History of Rationalism*, Vol. I, chap. i.

³ Bodin, *The Six Bookes of a Commonweale*, done into English by Richard Knolles (London, 1606), pp. 47 ff., 262 ff.

⁴ Coker, *op. cit.*, pp. 230 ff.; cf. Merriam, *A History of the Theory of Sovereignty since Rousseau*, pp. 13-17; Figgis, *op. cit.*, pp. 143 f.

and Maine. His theory of the group basis of civil society gave Althusius the suggestions which he developed to that extreme now characteristic of the writings of Gumpłowicz and most German sociologists. In co-ordinating ethics and politics, he paved the way for Grotius, and his suggestions as to the influence of sympathy in society were in line with the later developments of this doctrine by Spinoza, Hume, Ferguson, Adam Smith, and Sutherland. By premising a lawless state of primitive freedom, he gave an impetus to that old tradition which received its fullest elaboration a century later in the writings of the Contract School, with its assumption of an unregulated state of nature.

In his work on historical interpretation he presented one of the first attempts at a philosophy of history, a line of investigation earlier attempted by Ibn Khaldun and later exploited by Vico, Voltaire, Turgot, Herder, Condorcet, Comte, and Buckle, and which still awaits a satisfactory completion.¹ Finally, his analysis of the influence of physical environment upon society and politics was the most elaborate and systematic that had yet appeared, though not as original as is usually affirmed; and it may have furnished Montesquieu with many suggestions. He interpreted the conventional doctrine of the superiority of the peoples of the temperate climates so as to establish the pre-eminence of the French.²

VII. SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY DURING THE GENERAL DOMINATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF A SOCIAL CONTRACT

The formulation and well-nigh universal prevalence of the social contract theory of the origin of organized society from 1600 to 1800 are somewhat more difficult definitely to account for on the basis of the existing political and social environment than any of the preceding type of social and political theory. Professor Carlyle has made clear the general diffusion of the doctrine of a

¹ Cf. Flint, *op. cit.*, pp. 190-200.

² On Bodin, see Meuten, *Bodin's Theorie von der Beinflussung des politischen Lebens durch ihre geographische Lage* (1904); Baudrillart, *Jean Bodin et son temps* (1853); Fournol, *Bodin, prédécesseur de Montesquieu* (1896); Dunning, *A History of Political Theories from Luther to Montesquieu*, pp. 81-123; Figgis, *op. cit.*, pp. 143 ff.; and Chauviré, *Jean Bodin, auteur de la République* (1914).

governmental compact throughout the mediaeval period,¹ and it has already been pointed out that Aeneas Sylvius had apparently made the important distinction between the governmental and the later or social compact. Professor Giddings has insisted that the social contract theory grows up naturally out of a society where political relations have long been based on parliamentary procedure and sound legal foundations, and where there is a considerable degree of homogeneity in the population.² The fact that the first definite instances of the enunciation of the social contract theory may be assigned to churchmen, who had been under the sway of the long-established legal systems of the Catholic church and the Church of England, lends plausibility to this theory. Again, Professor Ritchie has pointed out the prevalence of actual contractual associations in the seventeenth century, such as the Mayflower Compact, the Solemn League and Covenant, and the associations of the Commonwealth period, and has further indicated the value of the contract doctrine to those writers who were seriously concerned with establishing the basis and justification of political liberty.³ Finally, it needs to be noted that the contract theory bore a definite relation to the economic and political conditions of the period. The growth of capital had made possible the existence of strong national states and had emphasized the importance of contracts in the sphere of economic activities. The origin and justification of these powerful political organizations offered an attractive problem to the social and political philosophers, and the doctrine of a social contract was the first important modern philosophical solution of this problem. It should always be borne in mind that the majority of the exponents of the contract theory did not advance that theory as a historical explanation of the origin of the state, but rather as an analytical interpretation of its existence. Many eager critics have made undeserved capital out of a misunderstanding of this important aspect of the contract theory,

¹ *American Historical Review*, October, 1913, pp. 6-8; *A History of Medieval Political Theory*, III, 168, 185.

² *American Journal of Sociology*, September, 1904, pp. 169-70.

³ "Contributions to the History of the Social Contract Theory," in the *Political Science Quarterly*, 1891, pp. 665-67.

though Hume showed that its analytical foundations were as weak as its historical basis.¹

The work of the English churchman Richard Hooker (1552-1600) was almost as suggestive as that of Bodin.² While his great treatise, *The Laws of an Ecclesiastical Polity* (references are to the edition of 1821), dealt primarily with the defense of the Anglican church, he devoted a portion of the first book to a discussion of society and government in general.

Hooker emphasized the fact that government originated in the consent of the governed and must be administered according to law, and thus agreed with the previous doctrines of a governmental compact and popular sovereignty.³ This doctrine of a contract as the origin of government was an old one; it had appeared in the writings of the Sophists, of Epicurus, Lucretius, the Roman lawyers, Manegold of Lautenbach, Aquinas, Marsiglio, William of Ockam, Nicholas of Cues, and the Monarchomachs of the sixteenth century, such as Hotman, Languet, Knox, and Buchanan, but no previous writer, with the possible exception of Aeneas Sylvius, had advanced the doctrine of a social contract, namely, that society arose by the deliberate agreement of men to escape from the evils of a presocial condition.⁴ Hooker, however, explicitly states this doctrine of a social contract, and it seems certain that he may be accorded the rather questionable honor of having originated the theory as far as practical results are concerned.⁵ However, Hooker did not go so far as Hobbes and claim that man in the state of nature was unsociable. He agreed with Aristotle on this point,

¹ For the fullest discussion of the environmental background of the social contract theory, see F. Atger, *L'Histoire des doctrines du contrat social*, pp. 44-49, 91-94, 134-55, 226-52.

² Cf. Scherger, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

³ *Ecclesiastical Polity*, Book I, chap. x.

⁴ For a good discussion of the difference between these concepts, see Willoughby, *The Nature of the State*, pp. 55-56; for the best historical treatment of the social contract theory, see F. Atger, *L'Histoire des doctrines du contrat social* (Paris, 1906).

⁵ *Ecclesiastical Polity*, Book I, chap. x; cf. Willoughby, *op. cit.*, pp. 62-63; Tozer, *Rousseau's Social Contract*, Introduction, p. 10; Ritchie, "Contributions to the History of the Social Contract Theory," *Political Science Quarterly*, VI (1891), 666.

but asserted that sociability must be supplemented by a covenant which embodies the rules according to which association is to be guided and restrained.¹ Many other suggestions of interest were advanced by Hooker, but especially important was his reliance upon reason rather than authority, which marked a break with scholasticism.²

Another churchman of this time, the Spanish Jesuit Francis Suarez (1548-1617), in his *Tractatus de legibus ac deo legislatore*, expanded the doctrines of Aquinas by devoting especial attention to the function of law as a regulating principle in human association. To Suarez, man was almost a "legal animal," so minutely did he analyze his dependence upon law.³ In this respect he made his chief advances beyond Aristotle and Aquinas, for he accepted their dictum that man is by nature social.

Another important element in the work of Suarez was his harmonizing of the doctrine of popular sovereignty with the theory that monarchy is the best type of government. While the supreme power resides in the people, they may alienate it from themselves and confer it upon the ruler by an act of popular will, but once this power is delegated, it is irrevocable, except in case of tyranny on the part of the monarch.⁴

Suarez' contemporary and fellow-Jesuit, the Spanish writer Mariana (1536-1624), offered an interesting interpretation of the early history of human society. In the beginning men had lived like animals, without authority, guided only by instinct, but free from the greed and immoralities of civilization. However, man had greater wants than other animals, his offspring was less rapid in developing maturity, and he was less protected from dangers by his natural equipment. Therefore, to live in safety and comfort men had to group themselves together and submit to the authority of some capable leader who was able to direct the group for the general

¹ *Ecclesiastical Polity*, Book I, chap. x.

² *Ibid.*, Book I, chaps. v-vii; Dunning, *A History of Political Theories from Luther to Montesquieu*, p. 210.

³ *Op. cit.*, Book I, "On Law in General."

⁴ Cf. Littlejohn, *op. cit.*, pp. 262-96; Dunning, *op. cit.*, pp. 133-49.

welfare.¹ Thus, Mariana, while premising a pre-political state of nature, did not support the doctrine of the social contract, but rather declared for the instinctive sociability of man and the necessity for human co-operation. Mariana's picture of the state of nature probably approached nearer to that advanced by Rousseau in his famous second *Discourse* than that of any writer of the period. Again, his theory of the influence of the prolongation of infancy is directly in line with that elaborated by John Fiske.²

The German jurist Althusius (1557-1638), who was the first writer after Aeneas Sylvius on the continent of Europe to enunciate the doctrine of a social contract, also greatly elaborated the concept. He claimed that society was nothing but a contractual union of the various ascending grades of social groups, from the family to the state, and that the only foundation for the unity of any of these groups lay in a contract which embodied the rules of conduct and the regulation of the relation of command and obedience between the different members of the association. Althusius thus ignored the individual as a member of the state and submerged him in the constituent groups which went to make up civil society.³ Althusius thus is the precursor of the idea of a federal state and of the juristic concept of group personality as elaborated by Gierke and his English disciples, Maitland and Figgis. Another obvious resemblance, if not a genetic relationship, is to the theory of Gumpłowicz and Bentley, which is based upon the assumed group composition of the state. He thus carried to an extreme both the social contract ideas and the theory of Bodin that society and the state were primarily composed of lesser constituent groups and not of individuals as such. In addition he adopted Bodin's conception of the nature of sovereignty, but went beyond him in declaring that it must

¹ *De rege et regis institutione*, ed. of 1605, chap. i, "Homo natura est animal sociabile."

² Nothing could be more ridiculous than to assign the origin of this idea to Fiske, as it had been perceived by Anaximander and was the common property of all writers who discussed social origins for two centuries before the time of Fiske; Locke, Hume, Montesquieu, and Comte, among others, discussed the doctrine at considerable length.

³ *Politica Methodice digesta*, chaps. i, v-ix, xix.

always repose in the hands of the whole body of the citizens, as organized in the series of groups which constituted the state.¹

The famous Dutch scholar and statesman Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) may for all practical purposes be regarded as the founder of international law, though Peter DuBois, Gentilis, and Hooker had earlier made valuable suggestions; and he is most noted for his work in this field, which was embodied mainly in the *De jure belli et pacis*. However, in his "Prolegomena" to this work he advanced important doctrines regarding the origin and foundation of social institutions. While he interpreted society in its most general sense as being the natural requirement of human nature with its "appetite for society," he was convinced, on the other hand, that the state had its origin in a contract.² In his work on international law Grotius endeavored to promote that like-mindedness in regard to the essentials of international policy which Professors Giddings and Tenney have lately insisted is the indispensable factor in any possible hope for the future peace of mankind.³ While Grotius' work in international law was an innovation, his confusing and inconsistent theory of sovereignty and his denial of popular sovereignty were retrogressive.⁴

In the general period of Grotius and Hobbes there appeared a number of interesting developments centering mainly around the names of Campanella, Bacon, Filmer, Milton, Harrington, and the political documents of the Commonwealth.

The *City of the Sun*, written by the Italian friar Thomas Campanella (1568-1639), presented an imaginary utopian

¹ Althusius' work, *Politica Methodice digesta*, apparently is available in this country only through the copy recently acquired by the New York Public Library; the best treatment is by Gierke, who rescued Althusius from oblivion in his *Johannes Althusius und die Entwicklung der naturrechtlichen Staatstheorien* (1880), Vol. VII of his *Untersuchungen zur deutschen Staats- und Rechts Geschichte*, see particularly chaps. i-iii; also see Figgis, *op. cit.*, pp. 229 ff; Merriam, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-21; and Atger, *L'Histoire des doctrines du contrat social*, pp. 121-27.

² *De jure belli et pacis*, abridged translation by Whewell, "Prolegomena," particularly secs. 5-9, 15-16; Atger, *op. cit.*, pp. 155-62.

³ Dunning, *op. cit.*, pp. 160-61, 171 ff., 188.

⁴ Cf. Dunning, *op. cit.*, pp. 179-87; Merriam, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-24.

society, which, aside from the communistic tendencies which it advocated, was mainly interesting as offering a crude psychological interpretation of society and the state. In a way strikingly similar to that later developed by Comte he maintained that society was based upon the principles of power, love, and intelligence and could function successfully only when these had received proper distribution and recognition in the organs of political and social administration.¹

Bacon (1561-1626) is noteworthy as the philosophic herald of the approaching age of experimental science. He railed against the domination of custom and tradition in political and social usages, as well as in the field of scientific enterprise. However, he was equally inconsistent in both fields. In the same way that he rejected the scientific discoveries of Copernicus, Kepler, and Galileo, his own works on social and political philosophy were hopelessly antiquated and obscurantist, the only exception being his unfinished utopia, *The New Atlantis*.²

The *Patriarcha* of Filmer (d. 1653) was a severe attack upon the doctrine of the contractual origin of government, and, while Filmer appealed to reason rather than to authority and made a good case against the contract doctrine, his own substitute, namely, patriarchal authority bestowed upon Adam by God, was infinitely less valid than the contract doctrine.³

The chief contributions of the Commonwealth period to social and political philosophy were the individualizing of the conception of a social contract by assuming that every citizen must be a

¹ "City of the Sun," in Henry Morley's *Ideal Commonwealths* (1885), pp. 217-63; cf. Guthrie, *op. cit.*, chaps. iv-v.

² "The New Atlantis," in Morley, *op. cit.*, pp. 171-213; cf. Gooch, *Political Thought from Bacon to Halifax*, pp. 22-34.

³ The contrary view is maintained by J. N. Figgis, *The Divine Right of Kings*, pp. 1-2. Dr. Figgis points out the important fact that Filmer's "patriarchal conception of society is far from being the essence of the theory of the Divine Right of Kings; it is merely the best argument by which it is supported" (*op. cit.* p. 150). For Filmer, see pp. 8, 148 ff., 252.

Dr. Figgis' above-mentioned work contains what is incomparably the ablest and most sympathetic interpretation of the divine-right theory. While few are likely to be converted to Dr. Figgis' view, there can be no question but that one who has not read his exposition is disqualified to discuss the subject.

party to the contract; the appeal to the law of nature to establish the rights of men; and the formulation of the doctrine of popular sovereignty.¹ It was the contribution of John Milton (1608-74) to work over these doctrines into a philosophical statement and to promulgate them with sufficient coherence to secure their recognition.²

Harrington (1611-77), in his *Oceana*, presented, under the disguise of a utopia, a constitution for the Commonwealth government. His chief contributions were the doctrines that society must be organized according to psychological principles, so as to make certain the leadership of the intellectually élite, and in accordance with the economic system of any period. Political organization must be so constructed as to secure a predominating influence of the property-holding classes and the intellectual aristocracy.³ This theory has received its fullest modern exposition in the works of Loria, Novicow, and LeBon.

In spite of the previous developments of the social contract doctrine, it remained for the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) to give that conception its first classic statement. Going far beyond any of the previous writers in the detail and "remorseless logic" with which he analyzed the situation, he premised a presocial state of nature which was a "state of war of all men against all men," in which the life of man was "poor, nasty, brutish, and short."⁴ He flatly denied the dictum of Aristotle that man is by nature social, and maintained that all society is for gain or glory, and that any permanent social group must originate in the mutual fear which all men have toward each other.⁵ He was

¹ Cf. Dunning, *A History of Political Theories from Luther to Montesquieu*, chap. vii.

² Cf. Masson, *Life of Milton*; Gooch, *English Democratic Ideas in the Seventeenth Century*, pp. 177-83, 241-45, 314-19.

³ *Oceana*, ed. by Henry Morley, 1887; selections in Coker, *op. cit.*, pp. 356-78; Gooch, *op. cit.*, pp. 285-304; cf. the recent work of Russell Smith, *Harrington and his Oceana*; and T. W. Dwight, "Harrington" in *Political Science Quarterly*, II (March, 1887), 1-44.

⁴ *Philosophical Rudiments concerning Government and Society*, Molesworth's ed., chap. i, secs. 11-12; *Leviathan*, chap. xiii.

⁵ *Philosophical Rudiments*, chap. i, sec. 2.

as pessimistic as Machiavelli in his analysis of human nature and agreed with the latter that all human activity springs from man's insatiable desires.¹ To escape the miseries of the turbulent and unregulated state of nature, Hobbes held that all men agreed to unite into a civil society for their mutual protection and that, in doing so, they made an inalienable transfer of their individual powers to the general governing agent or sovereign.² He did not, however, hold that either the state of nature or the contract were necessarily true in a historic sense. His analysis was psychological, and he has been correctly called the "father of social psychology."³ It was the irrevocable nature of the contract and the conception of unlimited sovereign power which distinguished the doctrines of Hobbes from those of the majority of the other members of the contract school. Besides this voluntary contract, Hobbes contended that there might be another type based upon force where a conqueror compelled submission on the pain of death.⁴ In this latter version Hobbes is in line with the vital principle of the school represented by Gumpłowicz. Hobbes's conception of the nature and attributes of sovereignty was a valuable contribution, but by confusing the state and the government, he erroneously ascribed sovereign power to the latter.⁵

The German statesman and philosopher Samuel Pufendorf (1632-94) attempted a reconciliation of the doctrines of Grotius and Hobbes in his *De jure naturae et gentium*. His ethics were primarily those of Grotius, while his political doctrines were mainly Hobbesian.⁶ He held that the social instinct in man would account for the existence of the family and lesser social groups, but that a contract was necessary to bring into being the state and government. While Pufendorf began his analysis of the state of nature with the assumption that it was a state of peace, he ended with practically the same conclusion as that arrived at by Hobbes.

¹ *Leviathan*, chap. xi.

³ Wallis, *The Great Society*, p. 191.

² *Ibid.*, chap. xvii.

⁴ *Leviathan*, chap. xvii.

⁵ Atger's analysis of Hobbes's theory of the social contract is found in *op. cit.*, pp. 162-84; cf. also Leslie Stephens, *Hobbes*; and Graham, *English Political Philosophy*, pp. 1-49.

⁶ Dunning, *op. cit.*, pp. 318-19.

His conception of the contract was twofold. First, there was a social contract which embodied the agreement to unite; then a vote was taken to determine the form of government desired; and, second, the arrangement was ended by a contract between the government and the governed regarding the principles and limits of administration. Pufendorf thus united more clearly than Hooker the concepts of a social and a governmental contract.¹ His conception of sovereignty was as confusing as that of Grotius, for, while defining it as supreme power in the state, he held that it must be limited to what a sane man would term "just action."²

The Jewish philosopher Baruch Spinoza (1632-77) was, in his political theory, a member of the contract school. He agreed with Hobbes in the existence of a presocial state of nature which was one of war and universal enmity.³ Society, he maintained, had a purely utilitarian basis in the advantages of mutual aid and the division of labor.⁴ To render this advantageous association secure, however, it was necessary that its utilitarian basis be supplemented by a contract to give it a legal foundation and thus to guarantee to each individual in the society the rights which he possessed as an individual prior to the contract. He claimed that the contract was rendered valid only by the superior advantages which it offered, and that the sovereign was such only as long as he could maintain his authority. This justification of rebellion Spinoza considered to be the only safe guarantee of just rule and individual liberty.⁵ Spinoza was mainly interested in using the contract as a buttress for liberty, while Hobbes had been chiefly concerned in utilizing it to justify absolutism.⁶

¹ *The Law of Nature and of Nations*, trans. by Basil Kennett and annotated by Barbeyrac (London, 1729), Book I, chap. ii, pp. 102 ff.; Book VII, chap. i, pp. 629 ff.

² Merriam, *op. cit.*, pp. 28-30.

³ *A Theological-Political Treatise*, Elwes trans., chap. xvi.

⁴ *Ibid.*, chaps. v, xvi; *A Political Treatise*, chap. ii, sec. 15.

⁵ *Theological-Political Treatise*, chap. xvi.

⁶ Cf. Pollock, *Spinoza*; Atger, *op. cit.*, pp. 184-93; Dunning, *A History of Political Theories from Luther to Montesquieu*, pp. 309-17.

In his *Ethics* Spinoza gave a clear statement to the theory of reflective sympathy, earlier hinted at by Aristotle and Polybius, and later revived and developed by Hutcheson, Hume, and Adam Smith, and which occupies a prominent position in Professor Giddings' system of sociology (*Ethics*, Part III, prop. xxvii).

The *Patriarcha* of Filmer called forth two better-known works in refutation of its thesis. The first was Algernon Sydney's (1622-83) *Discourses concerning Government*. He criticized Filmer's work in detail and declared for the origin of government in the consent of the governed and for the indefeasible sovereignty of the people.¹

The second refutation of the *Patriarcha* constituted the first of John Locke's (1632-1704) *Two Treatises of Government*, but the second treatise was far more epoch-making in its doctrines, for Locke here set forth his important conception of the social contract and his justification of revolution. In his views on the state of nature, Locke differed radically from Hobbes, Spinoza, and even Pufendorf, in that he denied that it was by any means a condition of war or disorder. It was not even a presocial state, but was rather a prepolitical situation in which every man had the right to execute the laws of nature. The very social nature of man, Locke contended, would prevent the state of nature from being one of isolation and unsociability. The serious deficiency in the state of nature was an impartial judge who could settle all disputes in an equitable manner and take the power of executing the laws from the hands of each individual.² The chief and immediate cause of man's leaving the state of nature was the increase of property and the desire to use and preserve it in safety.³ This emphasis upon the safety of property might have been expected from the apologist of the bourgeois revolution of 1688.

Locke made the most direct claim of any writer of the school for the historicity of the social contract as the agent for initiating

¹ *Discourses concerning Government*, 3d ed. (1751), chap. ii, sec. v, particularly pp. 75 ff.; Scherger, *op. cit.*, pp. 144-47.

² *Two Treatises of Government*, ed. by Morley, Book II, chap. ii, secs. 6-7; chap. iii, sec. 19; chap. vii, secs. 77, 87.

³ *Ibid.*, chap. ix, secs. 123-24, 127; chap. xi, secs. 135, 138.

civil society and maintained that it must be assumed to lie at the basis of all civil societies in existence.¹

He differentiated clearly between the society formed by the contract and the government to which it delegated the functions of political control. By so doing he was able to show how the government might be dissolved without destroying the society itself.² This dissolution of the government, or revolution, was justifiable when the terms or purposes of the contract were violated by those in power, and the majority of the citizens were the only ones qualified to judge when the infractions had become sufficient to warrant revolution.³ Locke thus laid the foundation for the American and French Revolutions, as well as apologizing for the English Revolution of 1688.⁴

The work of the French churchman, Bishop Bossuet (1627-1704), may be taken as marking the last serious and important attempt to maintain in Western Europe the more crude theological interpretations of society and history that had been transmitted from the Dark Ages. In his *Discours sur l'histoire universelle* he repeated that extreme theological view of the philosophy of history which had become the heritage of, as well as the chief blight upon, historical study in Europe since the days of Augustine and Orosius.

His chief work on social and political philosophy was equally marked by obscurantism. He repeated the dogmas of the Fathers that man was by nature social, but, being also inherently evil, required governmental restraint to keep his lusts within bounds; and that this governmental restraint was best exercised by a paternal monarchy possessed of divine and absolute powers. As the title of this work, *Politique tirée des propres paroles d'Écriture sainte*, indicates, all of his points were reinforced by copious quotations from the Bible. But even such a prince of obscurantists as Bossuet could not remain entirely immune from the rationalistic

¹ *Two Treatises of Government*, ed. by Morley, chap. viii, *passim*.

² *Ibid.*, chap. xix, secs. 211-21.

³ *Ibid.*, chap. xix, sec. 240.

⁴ Scherger, *op. cit.*, pp. 148-49; cf. Graham, *English Political Philosophy*, pp. 50-87; Atger, *op. cit.*, pp. 204 ff.; and the exhaustive work of Bastide, *John Locke, ses théories politiques* (Paris, 1907).

tendencies of his time, and his terminology indicated that the categories of the Schoolmen had given way to those of the rationalists.¹

VIII. SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY DURING THE PERIOD OF ITS GRADUAL TRANSITION INTO SOCIOLOGY

About the beginning of the eighteenth century a new era seemed to be dawning in social philosophy. The old *a priori* speculation and interpretation of society in purely subjective terms was gradually abandoned, though there was a temporary recrudescence in the writings of Rousseau. Vico presented a theory of progress and a new attitude in studying primitive society. Berkeley and the Reformers showed the influence of Newtonian natural science. Montesquieu produced the first great objective and descriptive treatise on sociology. Voltaire partially crushed obscurantism. Turgot, Kant, and Condorcet were the first conspicuous advocates of the doctrines of continuity in history and the possibility of indefinite human progress, and, along with Herder and others, gave a great impetus to the philosophy of history. Hume presented the first great psychological interpretation of society and annihilated the social contract. Ferguson and Herder combined the objective and subjective methods of analyzing the social process. Economic influences were emphasized by the Physiocrats, Adam Smith, and the Classical Economists. The French Revolution emphasized to excess the doctrine of the amenability of social processes to rational and artificial direction. The scientific historical approach to the study of social institutions was manifested in Eichhorn, Savigny, Niebuhr, Ranke, and Guizot. Finally, Saint-Simon classified the sciences and pointed out the need of a synthetic science of society to furnish a basis for reconstructing the social order. Thus, the various lines of approach to the interpretation of social processes which were to converge in sociology were all in process of development during the eighteenth century and the first quarter of the nineteenth, and when one reflects upon the situation it appears neither strange nor miraculous that Comte was able to conceive of, and partially formulate, the laws of a synthetic system of sociology.

¹ Cf. Dunning, *op. cit.*, pp. 326-27; Atger, *op. cit.*, pp. 193-204; and Flint, *op. cit.*, pp. 216-34.

At the best, he simply combined a part of the interpretations which were current at his time.

The environmental origins of social philosophy during the period of its transition into sociology are not difficult to discover.

The older tendencies, centering about the perfection of the national state, furnished the center of orientation for the doctrines of the Mercantilists and the Cameralists, whose influence lasted well into the eighteenth century. The reaction against their excessive emphasis upon the paramount importance of the interests of the state and upon the value of state activity found expression in the *laissez-faire* doctrines of the Physiocrats and the English Classical Economists.

Natural science, which had received its highest expression in Newton, reacted powerfully upon eighteenth century political and social philosophy. If Galileo and Newton had been able to interpret the physical universe in terms of such simple formulas as the laws of "falling bodies" and "inverse squares," it seemed probable to the social philosophers that equally simple formulas could be found to explain and to furnish the means of controlling social and political phenomena. Whether or not this tendency had any influence upon the development of the contract theory it is difficult to determine, but it is certain that it was a foundation of the prevalent eighteenth-century doctrine that a few "self-evident dictates of pure reason" were adequate to interpret and to adjust social and political relations.

The critical spirit of the eighteenth century, which found its ablest representatives in Voltaire, the Encyclopedists, Hume, and Kant, can be traced to a number of sources. Bacon and Descartes, in the previous century, had proclaimed the futility of dependence upon the past. The development of natural science had contributed to a general spirit of scepticism and curiosity. The increasing geographical discoveries and explorations had kept up that process of the contact of cultures which is the most potent agency in awakening a criticism of prevailing institutions. The Deists had emphasized the necessity of introducing reason into religion, the very possibility of which had been denied by Luther.

All these forces and tendencies gave rise to that destructive criticism of old theories and institutions which was necessary to clear the ground for a new synthetic and dynamic study of society.

Shaftsbury, Pope, and the Deists attacked the current depressing theological view of the inherent depravity and hopeless wickedness of man and made possible the conception of man as a worthy and noble subject for scientific analysis.

The critical spirit, the Deistic conception of the reasonable decency of man, and the dynamic type of mind created by the further development of science, commerce, and industry made possible the idea of the future progress of the race so admirably expressed by Turgot, Kant, and Condorcet.

The Industrial Revolution, the greatest transformation in the history of humanity, broke down the foundations of the older social system even more completely than the Commercial Revolution had destroyed the mediaeval order. Out of the confusion, as an aid in solving the newly created social problems, there came a further development and differentiation of special social sciences. It was as a result of the necessity of providing a synthetic and systematic science of society to criticize the validity of the multitude of schemes presented as a means of reconstructing the disintegrated social order that sociology in its present connotation had its origin.¹

Not only were the eighteenth and the early nineteenth centuries a period of great importance for the development of sociology, as marking its gradual development out of social philosophy, but also at this time the writings of a distinctly sociological character were becoming numerous enough so that it is both possible and desirable to group and to treat the chief writers by nationalities, though certain general currents in European thought permeated all nations.

1. *Italy and France.*—Among the Italian writers of this period Vico and Beccaria were the most important for sociology. The first was one of the founders of the modern phase of the philosophy of history and the other was a leading theorist in the reform group.

In France, Montesquieu introduced the comparative and inductive method of studying social phenomena. Voltaire attempted a vast rationalistic history of civilization. The Physio-

¹ Cf. Small, *General Sociology*, chap. iii; Marvin, *The Living Past*, chaps. viii-x.

crats and Turgot investigated the economic basis of society. Rousseau gave the last classic statement to the social contract doctrine. Sièyes and Condorcet reflected the best tendencies of the Revolution, and Saint-Simon indicated the need of a systematic science of society to serve as a guide for reconstructing the social order.

Vastly different from the doctrines of his contemporaries of the contract school were the theories advanced by the Italian historian, jurist, and philosopher Vico (1668-1744), whose work, *La Scienza nuova*, is frequently regarded as the starting-point of historical philology, ethnology, and the modern idea of historical progress, and is often, but erroneously, described as the first treatise on sociology.

Vico rejected the notion of a social contract and expressed his belief in the natural sociability of man and the necessity of social relationships to produce the perfect human personality. He regarded religion as the constitutive principle of society and thus foreshadowed the doctrines of Hegel and Kidd.¹ By making highly original studies in the mental life of primitive man he opened the way for the modern school of philology, mythology, and comparative religion. He advanced a theory of progress which stated that development does not take place in a straight line, nor through perfectly identical recurring circles, but rather in a sort of spiral movement in which every turn is a degree higher and more advanced than its predecessor.² Finally, by discussing the relativity of the excellence of different social institutions, as determined by different external conditions, he led up to Montesquieu's elaborate discussion of this subject.³ The importance of this dynamic element, which pervaded practically all of Vico's theories, can hardly be overestimated, but Vico was seriously restricted by his failure to free himself from the crudities of the theological view of history and the social process.⁴

¹ *La Science nouvelle*, trans. by Trivulzi, pp. 97-98; 103, 168.

² Flint, *Vico*, p. 228; Delvaille, *Essai sur l'histoire de l'idée de progrès*, pp. 261-74.

³ *La Science nouvelle*, pp. 387-90.

⁴ The best edition of Vico's works is that edited by Ferrari in 6 vols., Milan, 1835-37. Michelet's *Œuvres choisies de Vico*, 2 vols., Paris, 1835, contain an abridged

The French philosopher Montesquieu (1689-1755) made important contributions to social philosophy, both in general method and in specific analysis of various aspects of the social process. His general method was objective and descriptive, and his work was, perhaps, the first conspicuous example of this line of approach to social and political problems since Aristotle's collection of his 158 constitutions on which to base his analysis of society as it appeared in the *Politics*.¹ There had been plenty of descriptive matter in the works of earlier writers, but it had been mainly a study of biblical and classical mythology and history, in which the exploits of Seth and Enoch and the heroes of Homer and Livy had been much more conspicuous than an analysis of contemporary societies. Montesquieu showed the influence of the geographic discoveries of the two previous centuries by turning his attention to every type of existing societies and seeking his "natural man" among the savages of his own time rather than in the period before the "Fall of Man."²

His specific contributions were equally important. While still adopting the term "state of nature," he attacked the idea that the natural state of man was one of war and insisted that the tendency toward association was strong enough to be designated as a law of nature.³

translation of the *Scienza nuova*, and of some minor works. A complete French translation of Vico's major work by Trivulzi, Paris, 1844, exists under the title *La Science nouvelle, par Vico*. There is no English translation with the exception of an abridgment of the section dealing with Homer. The best commentary is the recent translation by Collingwood of the Italian work by Croce, *The Philosophy of Vico*, London, 1913, Appendix iv of which contains an excellent critical bibliography of the Vico literature. A better-known exposition is Flint's *Vico*, 1884; and there is a short article by Swinny on "Vico and Sociology" in the *Sociological Review* for 1914, pp. 50-57; see also Cosentini, "La Sociologie et Vico," *Revue internat. de sociologie* (1898), pp. 430 ff. For Vico's theory of progress as well as for the history of that subject through the whole of the eighteenth century, see the exhaustive work by Delville, *Essai sur l'histoire de l'idée de progrès jusqu'à la fin du XVIIIème siècle* (1910), pp. 261-74 for Vico's doctrines.

¹ Cf. Dunning, *op. cit.*, pp. 394, 429.

² For a historical discussion of the entry of ethnological methods into the historical study of political theory and institutions, see an article by Professor J. L. Myres, "The Influence of Anthropology upon the Course of Political Science," *Publications of the University of California*, IV, No. 1, 1916.

³ *The Spirit of Laws*, Nugent's trans., Book I, chap. ii.

The main purpose of his work being to discover and indicate the relative excellence of the different forms of law and political organization among the diverse peoples of the earth, according to their relation to the various conditions of physical environment and national customs, he was led into the most comprehensive inductive and descriptive study of political and social phenomena that had ever been attempted. As a result of this study, he presented a far more complete and accurate interpretation of social processes in terms of environmental influences than had yet been developed by any other writer. Especially exhaustive was his treatment of the influence of climate upon social institutions.¹ This attention of Montesquieu to the relation of man to his environment gave added impetus to that school of geographic interpreters of historical and social processes which has found its most notable expressions in the writings of Buffon, Herder, Ritter, Guyot, Peschel, Buckle, Ratzel, Reclus, LePlay, Metchnikoff, Demolins, Semple, Ripley, and Huntington.

But the fame of Montesquieu in the past and his notoriety at present have been due more than anything else to his widely adopted theory that political liberty can best be secured in a governmental system in which the three departments of government were sharply differentiated and perfectly co-ordinated.²

Montesquieu's contemporary and fellow-countryman Voltaire (1694-1778) devoted a lifetime to a vigorous and successful attack upon the obscurantist tendencies of the theologians of his time.³ In addition to this, his *Essai sur les mœurs* was one of the earliest rationalistic attempts at a philosophy of history and a theory of progress and has been designated by a modern critic as the first real history of civilization.⁴

¹ *Ibid.*, Books XIV, XVII. Montesquieu has received an unwarranted degree of credit for the originality of his theory of climatic influences. It was not original, having been taken mainly from Dr. Arbuthnot's *Essay on the Effects of Air on Human Bodies*, 1733, and Chardin's *Travels in Persia*; cf. Dedieu, *Montesquieu et la tradition politique anglaise en France* (1909), pp. 209-25.

² *The Spirit of Laws*, Book XI, chap. 5.

³ Cf. Morley, *Voltaire*.

⁴ Fueter, *Histoire de l'historiographie moderne*, pp. 443-45; Delvaille, *op. cit.*, pp. 304-46.

The school of French economists founded by Quesnay and called the Physiocrats (flourished from 1750 to 1785) from the title of the work of Dupont de Nemours, one of their number, besides being the founders of modern political economy, made numerous contributions to social philosophy in general. In the first place, they believed in a *natural order* in all the affairs of the universe, extending, of course, to social processes. That order was "natural" which was the most beneficial. The conception of the natural order as equivalent to the normal or the best, rather than as identical with primitive conditions, was a considerable advance. They held agriculture to be the only productive industry and interpreted progress in terms of the amount of the net product from this industry. They advised an attitude of *laissez-faire* on the part of the government in order that the natural and beneficial order of things might not be disturbed.¹

The French economist Turgot (1727-81), the friend and defender of the Physiocrats, produced an interesting and original interpretation of progress and historical development. In his two discourses, delivered at the Sorbonne in 1750 on the *Advantages to the Human Race from the Establishment of Christianity* and *The Successive Advances of the Human Mind*, he set forth in clear and unmistakable language the doctrine of continuity in history, the cumulative nature of evolution and progress, and the causal sequence between the different periods of history. He also doubtless furnished Comte with the suggestions which grew into the latter's laws of the three stages of intellectual progress. While he described progress as primarily a process of intellectual improvement, the conception of continuity in development and the essential unity of the historic process was a brilliant contribution.²

¹ Cf. Mercier de la Rivière, *L'Ordre naturel et essentiel des sociétés politiques*, 1767; Dupont de Nemours, *Physiocratie*, 1767; and the recent commentaries of Higgs, *The Physiocrats*; Cheinisse, *Les Idées politiques des physiocrats*, 1914; Güntzberg, *Die gesellschaft und staatslehre der Physiokraten*, 1907; Atger, *op. cit.*, pp. 304-14.

² Stephens, *The Life and Writings of Turgot*, pp. 159 ff.; Schelle, *Oeuvres de Turgot* (2 vols. Paris, 1913), I, 194 ff.; Flint, *History of the Philosophy of History*, pp. 280-88; Morley, *Critical Miscellanies*, II, 78 ff.; and, most important of all commentaries, Delvaile, *op. cit.*, pp. 389-405.

The erratic and romantic Rousseau (1712-78) was the last of the classical contract school. In his earlier writings he took the position, in opposition to Hobbes, that the condition of man in the state of nature was almost ideal in its rude simplicity, and that the state of war was unknown in those idyllic days. The whole progress of civilization, while bringing increasing enlightenment, had but contributed to the physical and moral degeneration of the race and to the growth of inequality and corruption.¹

In his later writings he abandoned his praise of the natural state of man and took practically the same position as Locke, namely, that while this condition was not one of war, its uncertainties and inconveniences rendered the institution of civil society imperative.² The only way in which civil society could be instituted, and united power and general protection could be secured, was through the medium of a social contract.³ This contract gave rise to the state or civil community and not to the government.⁴ Rousseau thus distinguished between the state and government, making sovereign power the prerogative of the state and governmental power purely delegated. His definition of sovereignty as the absolute power in the state, growing out of an expression of the general will, was probably his greatest contribution to political philosophy.⁵

While the importance of Rousseau's conception of popular sovereignty is generally conceded, historians now tend to ascribe less importance to Rousseau's dogmas as direct causal influences in the French Revolution than was formerly the case.⁶

Finally, Rousseau's important contributions to educational theory in his *Émile* should be mentioned. He here laid especial emphasis upon the value of a spontaneous development of the whole inner personality rather than the mere acquirement of knowledge and also tended to infuse a democratic tendency in

¹ *Si le rétablissement des sciences et des arts a contribué à épurer les mœurs*, 1750; *Sur l'origine de l'inégalité parmi les hommes*, 1755. For a translation see Cole, *Rousseau's Social Contract and Discourses*, pp. 129-238.

² *Social Contract*, trans. by Tozer, Book I, chap. vi.

³ *Ibid.*, Book I, chap. vi.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Book III, chap. xvi.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Book I, chap. vi; Book II, chaps. iii-iv; Green, *The Principles of Political Obligation*, p. 90.

⁶ Cf. Scherger, *op. cit.*, Preface, chap. vii, and Part IV.

education by declaring it to be the right of every child to have a proper education.¹

The Italian reformer Beccaria (1735-1794), in his *Crimes and Punishments* (1764), developed the plea for a rational reform of criminal procedure which Montesquieu had suggested in his *Lettres Persones* and his *Spirit of Laws*. He was the chief literary figure in that movement for criminal reform in which men like Romilly and Howard were the leading practical workers. He proposed the slogan of "the greatest good for the greatest number" as the basis of legislation.² He accepted the social contract as the basis of civil society and individual self-interest as the main motive in government.³ But, while his general social and political philosophy was rather commonplace, his plea for the abolition of the barbarous methods of trial and punishment then in vogue is one of the bright spots in the history of a subject which has been peculiarly depressing.⁴

The Prerevolutionary and Revolutionary literature in France produced some interesting contributions to social philosophy. Socialistic tendencies appeared in Morelly's *Basiliade*, 1753, and his *Code de la nature*, 1755; in Mably's *De la Legislation*, 1776, and in Babeouf's *La Doctrine des Egaux*, 1793.⁵

¹ The best recent collection of Rousseau's social and political philosophy in French is Vaughn's edition of *The Political Writings of Jean Jacques Rousseau*, 1915; the *Discourses* and the *Social Contract* appear now in an excellent translation by Cole in the "Everyman's" series, the introduction of which contains a good bibliographic note; Tozer's translation of the *Social Contract* is a classic, as well as his excellent introduction; the *Émile* also appears in an English translation in the "Everyman's" series; Bosanquet's *Philosophical Theory of the State*, contains one of the best critical analyses of Rousseau's political theories. Another excellent critical analysis is Professor Dunning's "The Political Theories of Jean Jacques Rousseau" in the *Political Science Quarterly*, 1909. Atger's analysis of Rousseau's version of the social contract is to be found in *op. cit.*, pp. 252-304. Morley's *Rousseau* remains the best biography.

² English translation of 1778, Introduction, p. 24.

³ *Ibid.*, chaps. i-iv.

⁴ Cf. Parmelee, *Anthropology and Sociology in Their Relation to Criminal Procedure*, pp. 10-14.

⁵ On these writers, see Guthrie, *op. cit.*, chaps. vi-viii.

The best example of Revolutionary philosophy is to be found in the works of the Abbé Siéyes (1748-1836) and Condorcet (1743-94). The former is typical of the period through his defense of the third estate in *Qu'est ce que le tiers état?*, his attack upon the privileged classes, and his proficiency in drafting constitutions founded on a few self-evident dictates of pure reason.¹

Condorcet is representative of that group who looked upon the Revolution as the climax of a long period of preparation for a new era of civilization. Comte pronounced him as much the best student of "social dynamics" in the eighteenth century, as Montesquieu had been of "social statics." His *Tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain*, 1793 (an English translation appeared in 1795), was one of the most optimistic and original of the writings of the period. His review of the stages of previous history led him to believe that civilization was rapidly advancing and that the French Revolution might be regarded as the culmination of this process. He developed a theory of historical progress which was far in advance of the earlier doctrines of Vico or Turgot, and which he expressed mainly in terms of increase of knowledge and scientific achievement.²

His hope for the future of humanity was not less optimistic than his interpretation of the past. He made many remarkably accurate, as well as some extravagant, predictions as to what science would be able to accomplish for the race. He was thus one of the first writers to combine the scientific and utopian theories of society. All in all, his work is most refreshing in contrast to that depressing conception of a descent from a "golden age" which was first expressed by Hesiod and had largely dominated European thought from that time to the nineteenth century, especially after the classical conception had been reinforced by the Hebrew myth of a primal Paradise, which had come into the current of European thought with the introduction of Christianity.³

¹ Cf. Clapham, *The Abbé Siéyes; An Essay in the Politics of the French Revolution*, 1912.

² See especially English ed., pp. 1-40.

³ Cf. Branford, "The Founders of Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology*, July, 1904, pp. 110-20; Flint, *History of the Philosophy of History*, pp. 325-39; Morley, *Critical Miscellanies*, Vol. II; and especially Delvaille's treatment, *op. cit.*, pp. 670-707.

Henri de Saint-Simon (1760-1825) anticipated the main theoretical positions in the sociological system of Auguste Comte. If one substitutes the word "Sociology" for the term "science politique," used by Saint-Simon with practically the same connotation that Comte gave to sociology, then Saint-Simon may be said to have formulated Comte's chief theses, though even he but collected and systematized the doctrines current at the time.

After a critical examination of his works, M. Alengry enumerates the following as the fundamental doctrines advanced by Saint-Simon: Science must be distinguished from art in all departments of knowledge. The sciences must be classified in the order of their increasing complexity, and a new science—*la science politique*—should be put at the head of the hierarchy. This *science politique* must be based on the solid inductions of history and observation and must be animated by the conception of development and progress. The general law of progress is that formulated by Turgot and Burdin, namely, the law of the three stages of the psychological evolution of the race: the conjectural, the "miconjectural," and the positive. All sociological theories of progress must be founded upon this fundamental law. The practical conditions of social life, and not supernatural sanctions, must be made the basis of the new morality; and the improvement of the happiness of the race must be realized through a transformation of the present social order rather than in heaven. This transformation requires a new industrial organization, a new social and political system, and a union of Europe in a new fraternity, *Le Nouveau Christianisme*.¹ One who is familiar with Comte's system need not be told that all that remained was for him to expand and to systematize the outlines laid down by Saint-Simon, and the best critics agree that such was the primary contribution of Comte to sociology.²

¹ Alengry, *La Sociologie chez Auguste Comte*, pp. 435-74, particularly, pp. 466-68; cf. Barth, *Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Sociologie*, pp. 56-57; Friedrich Muckle, *Henri de Saint-Simon, die Persönlichkeit und ihr Werk*, pp. 252-78.

² Alengry, *op. cit.*, p. 476; Defourny, *La Sociologie positiviste*, pp. 350-54; cf. Gide and Rist, *History of Economic Doctrines*, pp. 198-231; Muckle, *op. cit.*, p. 278. Saint-Simon published an early outline of his system as *Lettres d'un habitant de Genève*, 1802

2. *Germany*.—In Germany the Cameralists put forward a constructive criticism of the methods to be employed in raising and in expending the revenues of a successful state. Idealism was represented by Kant, Hegel, and Fichte. Romanticism received its greatest impulse from Herder, and both Idealists and Romantics offered appropriate philosophies of history. Nationalism was extolled by Fichte and Hegel, and the historical approach to the study of legal institutions received a great impulse in the writings of Savigny.¹

The chief trend in German thought in the first half of the eighteenth century, as far as it was related to the development of sociological thinking, is to be found in the writings of the Cameralists, of whom Justi and Sonnenfels were the most important. They were a group of technological writers, rather than social philosophers, and, like the English Mercantilists, were mainly concerned with providing the national treasury with ample means to maintain its domestic policy and to defend itself against enemies from without. As Professor Small has very clearly pointed out, their chief significance in the development of sociological thought lies in the fact that they furnish perhaps the best example in the whole history of the subject of a group of writers whose writings were sharply oriented and co-ordinated by the definite purpose they had in mind.²

or 1803. This preliminary and incomplete sketch he filled out in a number of subsequent works, the most important of which are *Mémoire sur la science de l'homme*, 1811; *De la Réorganisation de la société Européenne*, 1814; *L'Industrie*, 1817; *Du Système industriel*, 1821-22; and *Le Nouveau Christianisme*, 1825. The best exposition of Saint-Simon's doctrines is the above-mentioned work of Muckle. Other valuable brief treatments are A. J. Booth, *Saint-Simon and Saint-Simonism*; and Paul Janet, *Saint-Simon, et le Saint-Simonisme*. The best edition of Saint-Simon's works is the Paris edition of 1865-78, *Œuvres de Saint-Simon et d'Enfantin*, 47 vols.

¹ The contributions of German writers on social philosophy to the tendency toward a transition from social philosophy to sociology during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is an obscure subject. Those who are interested in the development of sociological thought are awaiting the authoritative treatment of this period which has been promised by Professor Small as a continuation of his work on *The Cameralists*.

² Small, *The Cameralists*, chap. i.

The renowned German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) formally posed as the prophet of international peace, though later critics, like Professor Dewey in his *German Philosophy and Politics*, have attempted to show that the Kantian ethics, with their sharp distinction between the world of sense and necessity and the supersensible world of moral freedom and duty, are probably at the bottom of the German militaristic and nationalistic philosophy of the present age. He conceived of history as the record of the working out or unfolding of the plan of nature, which was the perfect development of all the latent capacities of man.¹ He claimed that the motive power in this process of development was the struggle within the individual and society between the forces of communism and competition.² Consequently, this process would move most rapidly in that country which allowed the greatest freedom to this struggle and yet secured individual liberty, protection, and the equitable administration of law. Such a condition, he asserted, cannot be attained until the external relations between societies have been put on a firm, stable, and peaceful basis and the resources of the nations set free to undertake the great program of progress and enlightenment.³ The only way to arrive at such a state of international peace is to establish a universal federation of nations.⁴ Looking back over history, Kant thought that he could see in its events the gradual working out of this very plan of federation and peace.⁵ Kant was an optimist and believed that progress was continually going on, and explained the criticisms of contemporary conditions as simply manifestations of a more refined moral conscience.⁶

Like Blackstone, he believed in the social contract as the philosophical basis of political obligations, though he denied its historicity and declared, with Burke, for the perpetuity of the contract.⁷

¹ *Idea of a Universal Cosmo-political History*, trans. by Hastie in his *Kant's Principles of Politics*, pp. 5-9; cf. Flint, *The Philosophy of History in France and Germany* (1874), pp. 388-405.

² Hastie, *op. cit.*, pp. 9-11. ⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 23-25.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 12-23.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 25-29. ⁶ Delvaile, *op. cit.*, pp. 576-93.

⁷ "On the Common Saying," trans. in part by Hastie, *op. cit.*, as "The Principles of Political Right"; see also Paulsen, *Immanuel Kant*, pp. 46-47, 348; and Atger, *op. cit.*, pp. 335-45.

Herder (1744-1803), in his *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit*, was producing the most comprehensive philosophy of history that had yet appeared, though Bury¹ errs in declaring him the founder of that subject. While Herder was an environmentalist to a certain extent and tried to work out a theory of history on the basis of the modification of man's own powers by the conditions of his physical environment, he did not neglect the psychological factors embodied in customs and ideals. His treatment of primitive life was so suggestive as to make him regarded by many as the founder of comparative ethnology, but his treatment of the oriental and classical peoples was less valuable.²

The want created by Herder's weakness in treating the history of antiquity was supplied by the work of Heeren (1760-1842), whose masterpiece, *Ideen über die Politik, den Verkehr, and den Handel der vornehmsten Völker der Alten Welt*, was the first great work which exploited what is now being recognized as a most fertile field of historical investigation, namely, the influence of commerce and industry upon the course of historical development. His line of approach received an impetus with the work of Marx and is now being developed by the most progressive historians on both sides of the Atlantic.³

The post-Kantian German idealists Fichte (1762-1814) and Hegel (1770-1831) had an important influence upon the development of social philosophy and political thinking. Fichte is noted mainly for three contributions. In the first place, he carried the theory of a social contract to a greater extreme than any other adherent of that doctrine.⁴ Secondly, his *Der Geschlossene Handelsstaat* was one of the earliest presentations of a doctrine of state socialism, though the basis of Fichte's conception was idealistic and not economic, as in the case of Marx. Finally, in his *Reden an*

¹ *Ancient Greek Historians*, p. 240.

² An English translation of Herder's work by Churchill appeared in 1800; cf. Flint, *The Philosophy of History in France and Germany* (1874), pp. 375-87.

³ An English translation of the 4th edition of Heeren's work by Tolboys appeared in 1833.

⁴ Cf. Atger, *op. cit.*, pp. 346-57.

die deutsche Nation he set forth the highly patriotic but equally exaggerated and chauvinistic conception of the superior quality and mission of the German people, which was absorbed and transmitted with greater effect by Hegel, and in turn taken up and elaborated by the great German historians of the nineteenth century—Ranke, Droysen, von Sybel, and Treitschke. The influence of this line of thought upon the growth of the spirit of nationalism, which lies at the basis of the modern militaristic system, can scarcely be overestimated.¹

The ponderous dialectician Hegel took up the work of Fichte in educating the German people as to their superior mission in the world. He conceived of society as the means of developing and setting free the human will and personality. He believed that this freedom was progressively realized, not only in the different stages of society from the family through civil society to the state, but also in the different periods of history. In the stages of society the family is the reproductive organ; civil society the economic aspect of social organization; and, finally, the state, the highest and most perfect of the grades of society, is almost an ineffable entity—the synthesis of universal and individual will, of objective and subjective freedom—something for unrestrained adulation. As the state is the philosophical realization of this perfected rationality and freedom, so in the German people is to be found its historical manifestation. The *Weltgeist*, after having temporarily sojourned among the oriental and classical nations, had seen fit to take up its abode among the Germans, whose mission it was to bring to the world the conception that freedom is the prerogative of every man.² One has only to reflect upon Hegel's philosophic pre-eminence in Germany and the significance of his conceptions to understand his overwhelming influence upon the nationalistic tendency of nineteenth-century thought in Germany.³ Aside

¹ On this point, see the brilliant work of Guiland, *Modern Germany and Her Historians*; and Rose, *Nationality in Modern History* (1916), Lectures III and VII; Dewey, *German Philosophy and Politics*, pp. 68–80, 99–107.

² Cf. Flint, *The Philosophy of History in France and Germany*, pp. 496–541; Dewey, *op. cit.*, pp. 107–20.

³ Cf. Clarke, "Bismarck," in *Contemporary Review*, January, 1899, pp. 1–17; Dewey, *op. cit.*, pp. 119, 119–20.

from this phase of his influence, his emphasis upon society as a *process* of realization has been important in German sociology and is particularly evident in the work of Ratzenhofer, the greatest of German sociologists.¹

Savigny (1779-1861) was the true founder of historical jurisprudence in Germany. He emphasized the necessity of observing the principle of historical development in the formation of law, maintaining that it develops unconsciously out of the genius of a people. As a living organic thing it cannot be codified.² In his memorable controversy with Thibaut in 1814 he vigorously opposed the proposition to prepare a code of law for Germany. Like Burke, then, his grasp of history was more apparent than real, and both were equally blind to the practical value of new legislation. That a later generation has upheld the judgment of Thibaut is seen by the formation of the magnificent German Imperial Code, which was framed between 1874 and 1900.³

3. *England*.—Among the English, conservative tendencies were manifested in Berkeley, Bolingbroke, Blackstone, and Burke. The critical spirit was imbibed by Hume and Paine. Ferguson and Smith went deep into the sociological foundations of society. Godwin reflected the optimism of Kant and Condorcet. Malthus

¹ The most convenient, if not the most trustworthy, place to find Hegel's social philosophy is in Morris' paraphrase of his *Philosophy of Right and History*, though both appear in full English translations. The best treatment of the sociological importance of the German Idealists in the stimulation of nationalistic and militaristic doctrines is Dewey's *German Philosophy and Politics*. A brilliant analysis of their political doctrines is to be found in the work of their English disciple, Bosanquet, *op. cit.*; while their political theories are best summarized by Professor Dunning in his articles "The Political Theories of the German Idealists" in the *Political Science Quarterly* for 1913. The classic exposition of Hegel's philosophy is to be found in Kuno Fischer's *Hegel's Leben, Werke und Lehre*.

² "Law to him was a creation of the collective national mind, intimately interwoven with national life and character, and with the permanent conditions of the national civilization. . . . The work of many generations, it was beyond the absolute control of any particular age."—Ernst Freund, in *Political Science Quarterly*, V, 474.

³ On Savigny, see Ernst Freund, "German Historical Jurisprudence," in *Political Science Quarterly*, V (1890), 468-86; Georges Bonnet, "La Philosophie du droit chez Savigny," *Rev. Internat. Soc.*, 1913, pp. 145 ff., 232 ff., 302 ff.; and Kantorowicz, "Qu'est pour nous Savigny?" *ibid.*, 1914, pp. 537-65.

called attention to the practical obstacles in the way of indefinite progress. Finally, the Utilitarians offered a constructive criticism of the social order.

The work of the brilliant Irish prelate George Berkeley (1685-1753) was as important for sociology as for philosophy. In his *Sermon on Passive Obedience*, which is largely devoted to a criticism of Locke's theory of revolution, he does not commit himself to the belief in a social contract, but holds that, if such a process be assumed, then its terms must be binding in perpetuity. He assumes the natural sociability of man and the necessity of government to regulate society; from these premises he concludes that obedience to established authority must be regarded as a law of nature.¹

More important than this bit of reactionary theory is a generally neglected essay on *The Principles of Moral Attraction*, which is one of the most suggestive essays in the whole history of social philosophy. This is probably the first attempt to interpret social processes in terms of the Newtonian laws of mechanics. Assuming that the social instinct is analogous in society to the principle of gravitation in the physical world, he worked out in an ingenious manner the ways in which this force operates in society to create the different social forms and institutions. As masses attract each other more strongly in proportion as their distance of separation is diminished, so the attraction of different individuals in society for each other increases in proportion to the degree of resemblance which they bear to each other. Again, as the tendency toward sociability and co-operation is the centripetal force in society, so human selfishness and individualistic traits are the centrifugal forces, and stable society can only exist when the former is in excess of the latter. The similarity between these conceptions and certain vital portions of the sociological systems of Mr. Spencer and Professor Giddings is apparent.²

In England at this time Bolingbroke (1678-1751), though never producing any coherent body of social philosophy, ranged over the

¹ Berkeley's *Works*, ed. by Frazer, 4 vols., IV (1901), 111-18.

² *Ibid.*, IV, 186-190.

whole field with great suggestiveness in his various essays, and one must hesitate to assign absolute originality to any doctrine in social and political philosophy put forward in England during the middle of the eighteenth century without having previously made sure that it is not to be found in one of Bolingbroke's essays.¹

However, suggestive as Bolingbroke may have been, there can be little doubt that the contributions of David Hume (1711-76) to social philosophy are the most important that any Englishman advanced before the time of Ferguson and Adam Smith. As Montesquieu had been the herald of descriptive sociology, so Hume came nearer to modern psychological sociology than any other man of his age.

In the first place, he totally destroyed the historical and philosophical foundations for the doctrine of a social contract, and the fact that Rousseau and others later dared to advance this theory is either a serious reflection upon their intelligence or an indication of their ignorance of Hume's destructive criticism. Society, according to Hume, had its origin in instinct and not in intelligent self-interest. Man is by nature a social being; the state of nature is only the creation of the imagination of a priori philosophy; and the social contract theory assumes the impossible condition of knowledge prior to experience.²

As a substitute for this rejected doctrine, Hume offered a psychological interpretation of society of the utmost importance. Society originates in the sex-instinct, which is the ultimate social fact. This gives rise to the family, which is held together by that sympathy which always springs among those who are alike and dwell in contiguity. Sympathetic bonds are soon supported by custom and habit, which gradually make the group conscious of the advantages of association. This genetic group expands and is held together

¹ See the *Works of Bolingbroke*, 8 vols., London, 1809; particularly important are the "Dissertation on Parties," III, 3-312; and "The Idea of a Patriot King," IV, 225-334. In his *A Collection of Political Tracts*, 1748, especially significant is the essay on "Liberty and the Original Compact between the Prince and the People," pp. 284-94.

² *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. by Green and Grose, II, 183, 259-73; *Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary*, ed. by Green and Grose, I, Part I, Essay V; Part II, Essay XII.

at first by the influence of sympathy and mutual aid, but human selfishness renders this sympathetic and functional basis of association inadequate, and efficient social control is found only in the institution of government. Government originates in force and develops its authority and stability from a growing sense of common interest on the part of the group. Thus the social process starts in instinct, develops through the agency of feeling and emotion, and, finally, comes under the control of the intellect.¹

Especially important in Hume's psychological interpretation of society was his emphasis upon sympathy as the chief factor in social assimilation² and upon imitation as the cause of "type-conforming" groups. His analysis of imitation as the force which reduces social groups to cultural homogeneity was an attack upon the environmental theories of Montesquieu and is a direct anticipation of Bagehot and Tarde.³ In addition, Hume was probably the first writer to develop a real psychological interpretation of religion.⁴ Finally, his emphasis upon utility as the criterion by which to justify the desirability of any institution was the starting-point for the social philosophy and ethics of the English utilitarians.⁵

The jurist Blackstone (1723-80), in discussing the origin of society and government,⁶ refused to accept the doctrine of a state of nature and a subsequent social contract as a historic fact, but, nevertheless, claimed that it was man's weakness in isolation which was the primary motive for association, and that contractual relations must be implied as the philosophic foundation of society and government. Like Sir Henry Maine, he considered that the primary social group was the patriarchal family, and held that larger societies were but reunited offshoots of the original family

¹ *A Treatise of Human Nature*, II, 111, 114, 140, 155, 183, 259-65; *Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary*, I, 113-14, 450; II, 197 f., 204.

² *Treatise of Human Nature*, II, 111 ff.; 349 ff.; *Essays*, II, 214 f.

³ *Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary*, I, 244 ff.

⁴ *Treatise of Human Nature*, II, 435, 460 ff.; *Essays Moral, Political, and Literary*, II, 309-10, 334 f., 364.

⁵ *Essays*, II, 202 ff.; cf. Leslie Stephen, *English Thought in the Eighteenth Century*, II, 86-104.

⁶ *Commentaries on the Laws of England*, ed. by Cooley (1878), I, 46-47.

that had dispersed because they had become too large for a single habitation. Blackstone's view of the attributes of sovereignty as supreme, irresistible, absolute, uncontrolled power in the state greatly resembles the definitions of Professor Burgess, and it is generally agreed that the theories of these men stand in a direct line of descent. While Blackstone's doctrines were fiercely attacked by Bentham, they are erroneous in matters of detail rather than in principle.¹

The fundamental contribution of the political philosopher and orator Edmund Burke (1729-97) was his eloquent and commanding statement of the corporate unity of society. He ruthlessly criticized the a priori and rationalistic political philosophy of his time and declared that the construction of governments was not a matter of reason, but of historic growth and long experience. Burke's view of history, however, was not dynamic; it was to him merely an instrument to support or to defend existing institutions and to combat change. While accepting a modified version of the contractual basis of society, he maintained that this contract was universal in scope and application and binding in perpetuity, and he bitterly assailed the version which justified revolution.² In his essay on *The Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful*³ he presented a brief but highly suggestive analysis of the influence of sympathy, imitation, and ambition in the social process.

Burke's rabid criticism of the French Revolution was effectively answered by Tom Paine (1737-1809) in his *Rights of Man* and his *Dissertation on the First Principles of Government*. According to Paine, man was by nature social, owing to his social instinct and the necessity of co-operative activities. The state of nature was not presocial, but one in which men possessed the natural rights of liberty and equality. This had to be abandoned and governmental

¹ Cf. Pollock, *A History of the Science of Politics*, pp. 84-85.

² *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, Vol. IV of his *Works*, London ed. (1852), pp. 199-201, 229-30.

³ *Works*, II, 588 ff. On Burke, see MacCunn, *The Political Philosophy of Burke*; Graham, *op. cit.*, pp. 88-173; and Rogers, "The Social Philosophy of Burke," *American Journal of Sociology*, July, 1912.

authority established because of human imperfections which made unregulated existence intolerable. Government was created by a contract between the members of society and not between the governed and the governors. Man did not give up his natural rights when government was established, but merely added civil rights to them. Paine recognized that general social relations, customs, co-operation, and the like were infinitely more important to the individual than government, and regarded the latter as at best artificial and a necessary evil. His criticism of monarchy was an admirable antidote to Bossuet, and he was one of the most ardent advocates of democracy and popular sovereignty in the eighteenth century. Especially important was his doctrine that the minority must be protected by constitutional checks on absolute majority rule.¹

The contributions of the Scotch philosopher Adam Ferguson (1723-1816) to the history of sociology have not been sufficiently acknowledged. French and German writers, like Comte, Gumplowicz, and Ludwig Stein, have recognized his importance, but English and American students of the subject have generally minimized or entirely overlooked the genuine worth of his work. If anyone before Saint-Simon and Comte has the right to be designated as the "father of sociology," it is not Adam Smith, but Ferguson. Indeed, aside from certain formal distinctions, laws, and terminology originated by Saint-Simon and Comte, Ferguson's *History of Civil Society*, which appeared in 1765, is quite as much a treatise on sociology as Comte's treatment of "social physics" in his *Positive Philosophy*.

That Ferguson was moving in the right direction may be seen by the fact that he combined the descriptive and historical method of Montesquieu with the psychological and critical procedure of Hume. His treatment was thus both concrete and analytical. He rejected all a priori methods, as well as the ideas of a state of nature or a social contract.² He insisted on studying society as it

¹ Paine's *Works* are edited by Conway in 4 vols., 1894-96. His political theories are admirably analyzed by Merriam in the *Political Science Quarterly*, September, 1899; Coker's *Readings*, pp. 18-32, give important selections from his works; cf. also Giddings, "Sovereignty and Government," *Political Science Quarterly*, XXI, 19 ff.

² *History of Civil Society*, Part I, sec. i.

is, and from such study he found that the primary social fact is the inherent sociability of the human species resulting from instinct supported by convenience.

The dynamic element was very strong in the work of Ferguson, and he ridiculed the ideas of Aristotle and Hobbes that social stability and peace were the chief ends in society,¹ and laid such stress upon the value of competition and conflict in social development that Gumpłowicz has claimed him as the first great apostle of the "group-struggle" theory of social development.² Ferguson's contribution to sociology is a neglected subject that would amply repay an exhaustive analysis.

In the writings of the distinguished classical economist and philosopher Adam Smith (1723-90) are to be found the starting-points for two of the modern schools of sociology. His elaboration of Hume's theory of generic sympathy furnishes the basis for the type of theory of which Professor Giddings is the most distinguished exponent,³ and his development of the theory of mutual aid, division of labor, and of the social influence of economic interests in general, is one of the important premises of the system of the socio-economic school of sociologists which prevails in Germany and of which Professor Small is the most prominent spokesman in America.⁴ But any claim by either of these schools that Smith's treatment of these problems was sufficiently original to justify his designation as the most important precursor of sociology before Comte is very extravagant. All of his sociological ideas, and many of his economic principles, were the common intellectual property of the time, and, like Comte, Smith was an elaborator and a systematizer and not an innovator.⁵

¹ Delvaille, *op. cit.*, pp. 474-87.

² Gumpłowicz, *Die sociologische Staatsidee*, pp. 77-80.

³ Cf. Preface to his *Principles of Sociology*, 3d ed.

⁴ Cf. his *Adam Smith and Modern Sociology*.

⁵ Smith's major works, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* and *The Wealth of Nations*, are available in numerous editions. The recently recovered notes from his lectures delivered at the University of Glasgow have been edited by Cannan under the title, *Lectures on Justice, Police, Revenue, and Arms*, 1896. Rae's *Life of Adam Smith* is a good biography, and Huth has presented, with some far-fetched conclusions, the contributions of Ferguson and Smith to sociology in the work entitled, *Soziale und individualistische Auffassung im 18. Jahrhundert, vornehmlich bei Adam Smith und Adam Ferguson, Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Soziologie*, 1907.

As optimistic as Kant or Condorcet, but far less sound in his doctrines, was Godwin (1756-1836), whose *Enquiry concerning Political Justice* created considerable excitement when it appeared in 1793. Believing that all human misery was the direct result of the restraining and warping influences of coercive human institutions, and that government, at its best, was an evil, he advised the abolition of government, of strict marriage regulations, and of all social groups larger than the parish, and declared for the equal distribution of property. He was, on the other hand, emphatic in his praise of the non-coercive and spontaneous forms of society and co-operative activity. He held that the growing influence of reason and enlightenment would be the means by which the ultimate perfection of the human race would be attained. His hopes for the future of mankind were only exceeded by those expressed by Condorcet.¹

Quite different from the dynamic optimism of Kant, Condorcet, and Godwin was the doctrine of Thomas Robert Malthus (1766-1834). He called a halt upon all the theories which predicted the speedy approach of the social millenium by showing that population tends to increase much more rapidly than does the means of subsistence, and by pointing out how misery must fall upon the poorer members of society as long as this increase of population went unchecked by anything except the ravages of poverty, distress, and disease.² He proposed a preventive check in the shape of moral restraint, namely, refraining from marriage until sufficient means were accumulated to maintain a family in comfort. Not until this check was generally adopted should the "perfectionists" prophesy the end of human misery and poverty. While Malthus' doctrine was nearer to the truth in the static society of the eighteenth century, before modern invention or colonization had begun on a large scale, than it is at the present time, it was based upon a principle of undoubted validity. The

¹ Delvaille, *op. cit.*, pp. 525, 683, n. The best edition of Godwin's work is the third, in 2 vols., 1798; see especially his summary of principles in the Introduction, and Books II, III, VIII, and Appendix 1.

² Cf. Delvaille, *op. cit.*, p. 290.

undeserved disrepute into which the Malthusian doctrine has fallen has been mainly due to the fact that, though it was essentially a sociological formula, it has been dealt with chiefly by economists, many of whom have failed to see more than the material and physiological aspects of the "level of subsistence" or the "standard of living" and have missed the deeper psychological and sociological truths involved. More profound analysis at the hands of sociological investigators has established the essential truth of the Malthusian doctrine when given the broader statement which takes into account, not only the material, but also the dynamic, psychic, and social factors.¹ The immediate effect of his work was to give a pessimistic color to the classical political economy of the first half of the nineteenth century.²

In England during the first half of the eighteenth century the most important development was the Utilitarian philosophy of society, which received its vital impulse from Hume and its first important formulation by Bentham (1748-1832). Bentham first attained prominence in his *Fragment on Government*, published in 1776, which was a relentless attack upon Blackstone's social and political philosophy. While it was essentially the rending asunder of a straw man that Bentham had erected, this work is important in social philosophy for its acute differentiation between natural and political society, its detailed criticism and rejection of the theory of a social contract or of natural rights, and its justification of all forms of government by the principle of their *utility*. As his slogan for Utilitarian ethics and practical reform he adopted the phrase, earlier used by Hutcheson, Beccaria, and Priestly, "the greatest happiness of the greatest number," and his psychology was the crude hedonism which assumes that man is motivated by the desire

¹ Giddings, *Elements of Sociology*, pp. 304-7; Thompson, *Population; a Study in Malthusianism*, pp. 156-65.

² The final statement of the Malthusian principle is to be found in the second edition of the *Essay on the Principle of Population*, published in 1803. The significant parts of the two editions are brought together in *Parallel Chapters from the Two Essays on Population by Malthus*, N.Y., 1909, "Economic Classics Series." For a recent study in this field, see Thompson, *Population; a Study in Malthusianism*, 1915.

to secure pleasurable, and to avoid painful, experiences.¹ Bentham was a prominent figure in the movement for social reform during the first quarter of the nineteenth century. In the field of jurisprudence he was mainly influential in suggesting a doctrine of sovereignty which was adopted and elaborated by his successor, Austin.²

The Utilitarian principles of Bentham were perpetuated in the writings of James Mill and his greater son John Stuart Mill (1806-73). Aside from his progressively waning Utilitarianism, Mill, in his *System of Logic*, presents in the sixth book a discussion of the methodology which should be followed in sociology which is still regarded as valid.³ Mill was greatly influenced by Comte in his earlier years, but his interest in sociology flagged as time went on, and he turned his attention more to the problems of political economy and social reform.

Aside from specific doctrines, the great contribution of the Utilitarians was their emphasis on the value of concreteness and exactness in treating social phenomena, and in this they contrasted most favorably with the vague speculations and mystical fancies of idealists and obscurantists.⁴

IX. THE INTELLECTUAL ENVIRONMENT OF COMTIAN SOCIOLOGY

In addition to the eighteenth-century antecedents, which have just been summarized, it might be of value, in concluding, to take a brief inventory of the tendencies and developments in social science during the period in which Comte was developing his system—a period characterized by new and remarkable activities in every phase of social science.

¹ His psychology was taken over from Helvetius and has been recently accepted with some modification by Professors Patten and Ward.

² For a criticism of Bentham's doctrines, see Graham Wallas, *The Great Society*, chap. vii.

³ Cf. Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, pp. 52-53.

⁴ For Utilitarianism in general, see Stephens, *The English Utilitarians*, 3 vols.; Albee, *A History of English Utilitarianism*; and an excellent brief treatment by Davidson, *Political Thought in England from Bentham to J. S. Mill*, in the "Home University Series." Montague's Introduction to Bentham's *Fragment on Government* gives an excellent analysis of Bentham's doctrines, and Graham, *op. cit.*, pp. 174-347, analyzes the views of Bentham and Mill.

In the study of political theory and organization Bonald (1754-1840), Cousin (1792-1867), Constant (1767-1830), and Tocqueville (1805-59) in France; Hegel (1770-1831), Krause (1781-1832), Leo (1799-1878), Ahrens (1808-74), and von Mohl (1799-1875) in Germany; von Haller (1768-1854) in Switzerland; and Bentham (1748-1832) and Austin (1790-1859) in England were the chief figures.¹

In economics, the impetus given by the Physiocrats and Adam Smith was carried on by Sismondi (1773-1842) in France; Rau (1792-1870) and Thünen (1783-1850) in Germany; and Ricardo (1772-1823), McCulloch (1789-1864), and James and John Stuart Mill in England.²

Scientific historiography was taking form in the writings of Mignet (1796-1884) and Guizot (1787-1874) in France; Niebuhr (1776-1831) and Ranke (1795-1886) in Germany; and Hallam (1777-1859), Palgrave (1788-1861), and Grote (1794-1871) in England.³

The socialistic and social reform tendencies of early nineteenth-century thought were best reflected in the works of Robert Owen (1771-1858) in England; Saint-Simon (1760-1825), Cabet (1788-1856), Fourier (1772-1837), Louis Blanc (1811-82), and Proudhon (1809-65) in France; and Lassalle (1825-64) and Rodbertus (1805-75) in Germany. Their doctrines were in the main all motivated by the misery attendant upon the social transformation which followed the Industrial Revolution. While the earlier of these writers commonly advocated a refined type of utopian communism, Louis Blanc, Proudhon, Lassalle, and Rodbertus criticized any such visionary schemes and proposed more practical and immediate remedial measures. They may rightly be regarded as the main figures in the transition of socialism from the stage of utopian schemes to the scientific socialism of Marx (1818-83) and Engels (1820-1895). With the appearance of Marx's *Holy Family* in 1845 and his joint work with Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, in 1848, *scientific socialism*, with its basic premise that man can

¹ Cf. Merriam, *op. cit.*; Coker, *Organismic Theories of the State*, chaps. i-iii.

² Cf. Gide and Rist, *op. cit.*

³ Gooch, *History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century*.

directly control his social relations and the social process, and its dogmas of the economic interpretation of history—the labor theory of value, the theory of surplus value, class struggle, ultimate economic revolution, and state control of industry—was formally launched.¹

In the same year that *The Communist Manifesto* was published there appeared another work which indicated a line of approach to sociological problems which is now considered by many to be the most promising of all methods. This was the *Du système sociale et des lois qui le régissent* of Adolphe Quetelet (1796–1874). This work and his earlier *Sur l'homme*, 1835, and his later *Physique sociale*, 1869, were the first serious attempts to apply the statistical method to the interpretation of social phenomena. While his modern disciples are, no doubt, oversanguine in their anticipation of the amenability of social phenomena to statistical interpretation, there can be no doubt that it is destined to be the most effective means of bringing sociological generalization up to that level of certainty which is the mark of science.²

The biological foundations of modern sociology were systematized by Lamarck (1744–1829) in his *Philosophie Zoologique*, 1809, in which he stated his belief in the mutability of the species through the inheritance of acquired characteristics. The principle enunciated by Lamarck was further developed in the lectures of Sir William Lawrence (1783–1867); in Chamber's *Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation*, 1844; Spencer's early writings; and reached its first classic exposition in Darwin's *Origin of Species*, 1859, only to be modified by the later investigations of Mendel, Weismann, and De Vries.³

The geographic factors in social organization and evolution were analyzed with a thoroughness never before approached, by

¹ Cf. Kirkup's *History of Socialism*, 1913 ed., revised by Pease; and Gide and Rist, *op. cit.*, pp. 198–264, 290–322, 407–83.

² Cf. Hankins, *Adolphe Quetelet as Statistician*; Giddings, *Sociology, A Lecture*, pp. 22 ff., 36 f. On the history of statistics, see Harald Westergaard, "The Scope and Method of Statistics," *Quarterly Publications of the American Statistical Association*, September, 1916, pp. 229–37; J. T. Merz, *A History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century*, II, chap. xii.

³ Osborn, *From the Greeks to Darwin*, pp. 139 ff.; Judd, *The Coming of Evolution*.

Ritter (1779-1859) in his *Die Erdkunde im Verhältnis zur Natur und zur Geschichte der Menschen*, which first appeared in 1817-18 in Guyot's *Earth and Man*, and in Buckle's *History of Civilization in England*.¹

Finally, anthropology, ethnology, and prehistoric archeology were beginning to assume that form which renders them so valuable to sociology in the work of Blumenbach (1752-1840), Retzius, (1796-1860), Broca (1824-1880), Prichard (1786-1848), Bastian (1826-1905), and Boucher de Perthes (1788-1868).²

Auguste Comte (1798-1857) tried to work over and systematize a part of the leading tendencies in social science in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in order to form a comprehensive system of sociology. His indebtedness to Saint-Simon for his leading ideas has already been pointed out. Other influences may be discerned along with those of Saint-Simon. From Hume, Kant, and Gall³ he received his chief doctrines as to causation and positivism in method. Comte's peculiar view of history as a combination of the inevitable and the providential may be traced to the doctrines of Hume, Kant, and Turgot as to historical determinism and to the emphasis of Bossuet, Vico, and DeMaistre on the providential element in history. Montesquieu, Condorcet, and Saint-Simon had pointed out the need of a broad and fundamental science of society to act as a guide for political theory and practice. Finally, Montesquieu had introduced the modern conception of social law, Condorcet had elaborated the theory of progress, and Saint-Simon had insisted upon the necessity of transforming the social order.

There was thus extremely little that was original in the theoretical content of Comte's system of sociology; his main contribution was to give a comprehensive and systematic form to many of

¹ Ripley, "Geography as a Sociological Study," *Political Science Quarterly*, X (1895), 636-55.

² Haddon, *History of Anthropology*, pp. 28 ff., 35 ff., 38 ff, 84., 100 f., 135 ff.

³ Franz Joseph Gall (1758-1828), the famous German phrenologist. While Gall's theories are now merely curiosities in the history of mental science, they were of great importance as regards their fundamental premises. To hold that the human mind has a definite physical basis which renders it amenable to scientific investigation was, at the time, rather revolutionary.

the most important of the somewhat detached and incoherent doctrines which were current in his time. In many ways Comte was greatly behind the scientific achievements of his age, and quite failed to absorb many of the most important developments and innovations of the period, which have since entered into the shaping of sociological thought. At the same time Comte cannot be denied the claim to a certain degree of genius, for there have been few minds which have been able to grasp in a more penetrating or comprehensive manner the unity of human society and the vast number of factors which are involved in its organization and development.¹

This cursory enumeration of the chief tendencies in the study of social phenomena in the earlier part of the nineteenth century, gives one a basis for testing the validity of the assertion of Professor Small that sociology did not have its origin in isolation from the special social sciences, but that the latter had faced and partially solved many of the most important problems of sociology, and of the apparently contrary thesis of Professor Giddings that a new type of approach to the study of social phenomena, which was definitely sociological, began in a systematic way with Auguste Comte and developed directly through the writings of Spencer, Ward, and the sociologists of the present generation.²

The reconciliation of these conflicting views of the matter is to be found in their respective opinions of the nature of sociology. If one accepts Professor Small's contention that sociology is the philosophical synthesis and organization of the results of the special social sciences, then his view of the origin of sociology in the nineteenth century may be regarded as valid. On the other hand, if one agrees with Professor Giddings that sociology is the elemental

¹ Alengry, *op. cit.*, pp. 474-76; Defourny, *op. cit.*, pp. 350-54; Waentig, *Auguste Comte und seine Bedeutung für Sozialwissenschaft*; W. H. Schoff in *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, VIII (1896), 496 ff.

² Of course, this refers merely to sociology in its present connotation as a definite body of scientific knowledge dealing with an analysis of the social process. Both authorities are in perfect agreement as to the dependence of sociology in this sense upon the previous developments in social philosophy since the earliest Greek period. Cf. Small, *General Sociology*, pp. 40 f.; Giddings, *The Principles of Sociology*, chap. i; *Sociology, A Lecture, passim*.

and basic social science, distinguished by its investigation of society as a unity in its broadest and most fundamental aspects, then one must grant that the initial formal differentiation of sociology as a distinct science begins with the systematization of earlier doctrines by Auguste Comte. If, as Professor Ellwood¹ and Professor Vincent² contend, both views are tenable and mutually complementary, the conflict of opinions is more apparent than real, and one may seek the origin and development of sociology in the last century, both in the works of avowed sociologists and in the increasing tendency of the special social sciences to assume the broader sociological method of approach to their problems.

On the whole, this last solution of the problem seems the more accurate and satisfactory. The fundamental fact to be insisted upon is that the essence, if not the name, of sociology was an inevitable result of the necessity to provide an adequate science of society and an equally inevitable product of a gradually improving method of analyzing social phenomena, and that it was not the fortuitous and questionable invention of the mind of a single man nor the precarious and exotic product of a single age. It so happened that about the time when the general social, economic, and intellectual setting of Western Europe and the advances in positive knowledge and scientific methods had first made possible such a thing as a science of society, and when this possibility was already being exploited by a large number of writers, Auguste Comte, an enthusiastic thinker with a genius for assimilation and systematization, appeared upon the scene and gave a name and a systematic expression to an already powerful tendency. That sociology would not have come into existence in its present nature and strength, though perhaps under a different name, but for the work of Auguste Comte, is quite inconceivable to one who has read the previous works of Vico, Montesquieu, Turgot, Hume, Ferguson, Adam Smith, Herder, Condorcet, and Saint-Simon, or who has investigated the development of social science since 1850.³

¹ *Sociology in Its Psychological Aspects*, pp. 30-31.

² *American Journal of Sociology*, X, 158.

³ For a vigorous statement of the view that sociology is even at the present time but a figment of the sociologist's imagination, one should consult the articles by

X. THE CHIEF TENDENCIES IN SOCIOLOGY SINCE COMTE

Since the period of Comte there have been two chief tendencies in the development of sociological theory. On the one hand, there has been the attempt, which has been most successfully executed by such writers as Spencer, Ward, Giddings, DeGreef, Durkheim, Stein, Novicow, and Stuckenberg, to develop a complete sociological system which would embrace every phase of the subject, methodological, analytical, and historical. On the other hand, there has been the tendency to specialize in some distinct field of sociological research and to produce works which, while often highly systematic, made no pretension at covering the whole field of sociology. Of these special lines of sociological investigation some nine may be recognized: the methodological, the biological, the psychological, the "group-conflict," the anthropological-historical, the environmental, the statistical, the economic, and the philanthropic.

The most fundamental of the specialized types of investigation and the one which must serve as a starting-point for all varieties of specialized effort, is the *methodological*. This field has been most extensively cultivated by Frédéric Le Play, Professor Albion W. Small, and Professor Émile Durkheim. Others who have made important contributions to special phases of methodology have been Professors Pearson, Hobhouse, Barth, Simmel, Mayo-Smith, Willcox, Giddings, Ellwood, and Hayes.

Biological sociology has been exploited by the more strictly biological school, including such men as Darwin, Huxley, Wallace, Conn, and Keller; the "Organicists," including Lilienfeld, Schaeffle, Fouillée, Worms, De Roberty, Novicow, DeGreef, and Kidd; and by the newer "eugenic" school, which has furnished the center of orientation for the writings of Galton, Pearson, Bateson, Shuster, Lapouge, Schallmeyer, Steinmetz, and Tenney.

The *psychological* school, which has perhaps produced more gratifying positive results than any other special type of sociological

Henry Jones Ford in the *American Journal of Sociology*, XV (1909-10), 96 ff., 244 ff. These articles, together with the same author's *The Natural History of the State*, constitute what is altogether the best example known to the writer of the survival of the conventional views of the "presociological stage" in the development of social science.

theory, has been most effectively represented by Bagehot, Sutherland, Trotter, McDougall, and Wallas in England; by Tarde, Durkheim, Fouillée, and LeBon in France; by Sighele in Italy; by Simmel, Tönnies, and Wundt in Germany; and by Giddings, Ross, Sumner, Cooley, Baldwin, Ellwood, Ward, Vincent, and Howard in America.

The investigation of the sociological importance of the *conflict of social groups* has received the attention of Bagehot and Spencer in England; of Marx, Gumpłowicz, Ratzenhofer, Simmel, and Oppenheimer in Germany; of the Russian Novicow; of the Italians Loria, Vaccaro, and Sighele; and of Ward, Small, and Bentley in America.

Anthropological and historical sociology have been little developed by avowed sociologists, but have received attention mainly from ethnological writers. The chief of these have been the historical jurists Maine, Post, and Ihering; the classical or comparative anthropologists Bachofen, McLennan, Lubbock, Spencer, Tylor, Lang, Morgan, Brinton, Westermarck, Lippert, Bastian, Letourneau, Frazer, and Kovalevsky; and the more recent critical and analytical anthropologists such as Ehrenreich and Graebner in Germany; Boas, Goldenweiser, Kroeber, Lowie, and Swanton in America; and Rivers and Marett in England. Unfortunately, the highly scientific and equally revolutionary theories of this last type of ethnological investigators have scarcely penetrated sociological thought, which has been willing to travel the broad and easy but highly treacherous road of classical anthropology. No branch of sociology is in such great need of modernization of method and content as the anthropological and historical. Professors W. I. Thomas, Émile Durkheim, and L. T. Hobhouse have been the chief and almost the only sociological representatives of the modern critical ethnology.

Likewise, sociology, in the strict sense of the word, has given little relative attention to the subject of the *influence of the physical environment upon society*. This phase of sociological theory has been chiefly contributed by historians like Buckle and Payne; by students of geography, such as Ratzel, Semple, Metchnikoff,

Demolins, Reclus, Ripley, and Huntington; and by psychologists, such as Dexter.

The *statistical* line of investigation, which received its vital impulse from Quetelet, has chiefly interested Galton, Pearson, Yule, Bowley, and Edgeworth in England; Engel, Meitzen, Hasse, von Mayr, and Lexis in Germany; Le Play, Faure, Dumont, Levasseur, and Leroy-Beaulieu in France; Westergaard in Denmark; Bodio and Benini in Italy; and Mayo-Smith, Wright, Willcox, Moore, Durand, Chaddock, Weber, Boas, Thorndike, and Bailey in America. Professor Giddings has been the most ardent and effective advocate of the value of making a larger use of the statistical method in sociology, and, with the possible exception of the psychological school, the statisticians are the most promising group of workers in the sociological field.

Among the *economists* of the relatively orthodox group who have contributed most to sociology have been Wagner, Schmoller, Hobson, Ashley, Gide, Ely, Commons, Fetter, Carver, Jenks, Seager, and Patten. Among the most influential of the radicals have been the English Fabians, Bernstein, Jaurés, Spargo, Loria, and Kropotkin.

Some of the best-known contributors to the literature of *scientific philanthropy* have been Webb, Booth, Devine, Lindsay, Warner, Taylor, Addams, Henderson, Rubinow, Peabody, Goddard, Healy, and the long list of criminal sociologists and penologists.

Such a diversity of interests and so detailed a specialization and division of labor as is here represented makes it reasonable to believe that the most fruitful work of the future in sociology will be done by specialists who will yield up their results for such convenient synthetic compilations of sociological theory as have recently appeared by Eleutheropulos, Pareto, Cornejo, Posada, Blackmar and Gillen, and Hayes.¹

¹ It will be noted that the foregoing classification overlaps in some cases, but accuracy has been chosen in preference to logical exactness. Those who desire to fill in the gap between Comte and the present will find most valuable Ward's *Outlines of Sociology*, Part I; Small's *General Sociology*, chaps. iii-v; Ross's *Foundations of Sociology*, chap. ix; Jacobs' *German Sociology*; Hecker's *Russian Sociology*; and

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

As one has to search for the sources of sociological thought before Comte in the works of writers on political and economic theory, on theology, and on history, so one has to rely for a guide to these sources upon the special treatments of the history of these respective special social sciences. There are, however, two fairly satisfactory avowed histories of sociological thought from the earliest period. These are to be found in Ludwig Stein's *Die Sociale Frage im Lichte der Philosophie*, pp. 145-395, and in Guillaume DeGreef's *Le Transformisme social*, pp. 8-306. By far the best collection of extracts from the writings of the chief figures in the development of social philosophy is to be found in Coker's *Readings in Political Philosophy*. The history of political theory is outlined in Pollock's *History of the Science of Politics* and has received its best systematic presentation in W. A. Dunning's *History of Political Theories*. The classic work of Janet, *L'Histoire de la science politique*, has never been surpassed as a treatment of the development of political theory and its interrelation with ethical doctrine. The development of economic doctrines is briefly surveyed by Ingram's *History of Political Economy*, is conveniently presented in Haney's *History of Economic Thought*, and for the period since the Physiocrats is systematically treated by Gide and Rist, *A History of Economic Doctrines*. The history of theological doctrines is presented in Harnack's monumental *History of Dogma*. The history of history is surveyed in a fairly complete form in Bury's *The Ancient Greek Historians*, Fueter's *Histoire de l'historiographie moderne*, Gooch's *History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century*, and Flint's two volumes on the philosophy of history. An adequate recent treatment in English of the historiography of the mediaeval period is lacking. The most valuable and readily available special discussions of particular periods are the works of Barker, Loos, and Willoughby on the social and political theory of classical antiquity; the analysis of the social and political philosophy of the mediaeval period by Gierke, Carlyle, and Littlejohn; the treatment of the history of social theories between the mediaeval period and the eighteenth century in the volumes of Franck on *Réformateurs et publicistes de l'Europe*; Morley's and Stephen's analyses of eighteenth-century thought in France and England; and the treatment of the German social and political philosophy of this century in Small's *The Cameralists* and Bosanquet's *Philosophical Theory of the State*. The advanced student will naturally proceed to the investigation of the sources and the special monographs mentioned in the article. For an aid in interpreting the social environment of the history of sociological thought before Comte no other book which is known to the writer is at all comparable to the brilliant little volume by F. S. Marvin, *The Living Past*.

Bristol's *Social Adaptation*. Barth and Squillace provide a more detailed treatment, while Professor Vincent's "The Development of Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology*, X, and Professor Tenney's "Some Recent Advances in Sociology," *Political Science Quarterly*, September, 1910, admirably summarize the essential facts.